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INTRODUCTION
Many scholars have advocated for the abolition of jails and prisons
in the criminal justice context.1 Discussion of abolition has rightfully
extended to the topic of immigration detention in favor of eliminating
facilities operated by private for-profit companies and otherwise.2
Abolition seeks to eliminate a harmful system of imprisonment and to
build up something supportive in its place that is aligned with the
ultimate policy goal for which prisons were created—preventing harm
to communities. This Article seeks to extend the theoretical
framework of abolition to immigration detention in a discrete way:
advocating for universal representation as an alternative to
immigration detention. The current abolition movement “aims at
dramatically reducing reliance on incarceration and building the
social institutions and conceptual frameworks that would render
incarceration unnecessary.”3 The idea is to diminish the size of one
institution that is harmful and build up something else in its place
that is both effective and supportive to the affected individuals. Here,
universal representation is in itself a way to end the vast majority of
1. See, e.g., the works of Paul Butler, Angela Davis, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, and
Allegra McLeod for a discussion.
2. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration
Prisons, 97 B.U. L. REV. 245, 246–300 (2017).
3. Allegra McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1156, 1172 (2015).
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immigration detention and to ensure that immigrants attend their
hearings while also increasing the likelihood that they will succeed
in their cases.4 This Article seeks to expand the audience in the
abolition conversation by proposing that the provision of universal
representation in immigration proceedings, in lieu of pre-hearing
immigration detention, can help lower costs to taxpayers and promote
a more just and equitable society. The idea is that this appeal to fiscal
conservatives could reach across typical partisan or ideological
divides, and that an economic argument might enjoy a broader appeal
to disparate groups.
This approach is a practical one and built upon the same premise
that has led to the success of the decarceration movement in the
criminal context. Over the past decade, there has been a realization
across ideologies that the increasing number of individuals being held
in jails and prisons throughout the United States is untenable.5 An
effort to reduce those numbers has been embraced by both liberal and
conservative factions, though for different undergirding reasons.6
Advocates on the left based their support for lowering prison
populations on the fact that imprisonment in the United States
disproportionately affected people of color, was overly punitive, and
was not aligned with the ultimate goal of these harsh policies—
4. Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2141, 2188 (2017) (“[D]eterrence is not a legitimate reason for immigration
detention. . . . [I]mmigration detention is supposed to be nonpunitive and, therefore,
should be based on civil, rather than criminal principles.”); see also Emily Ryo,
Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 237, 248 (2019) (arguing that while
some observers believe that “the perceived costs of migration have not yet reached a
point where they offset the potential benefits [of migrating to] the U.S.[,]” immigration
detention costs the federal government $8.43 million per day).
5. Martha T. Moore, Conservatives, Liberals Unite to Cut Prison Population,
USA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2014, 6:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/2014/03/16/conservatives-sentencing-reform/6396537/; see also Shaila Dewan
& Carl Hulse, Republicans and Democrats Cannot Agree on Absolutely Anything.
Except This., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2018, at A18 (noting Trump’s endorsement of the
First Step Act after legislative changes in “traditionally red states”).
6. See Rebecca Goldstein, The Politics of Decarceration, 129 YALE L.J. 446, 461–
66 (2019) (finding that while left-leaning liberals focused on defining their reform
efforts as a need to confront structural racism and social inequality, conservatives
argued that prison budgets consumed too many tax dollars). Criminal justice reform
is an ascendant issue in both the Democratic and Republican parties: “Since the end
of the crime wave, a determined combination of libertarians, budget hawks, and
evangelical activists have taken advantage of falling crime rates to successfully
challenge the Republican Party’s longstanding tough-on-crime positions.” Id. at 463.
An unlikely coalition has formed around the issue, most notably a bipartisan criminal
justice reform advocacy group that united the Koch brothers with the ACLU and the
NAACP, leading to the passage of the First Step Act. Id. at 464–66.
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reducing crime levels. Advocates on the right based their support
primarily on the fiscal repercussions that accompanied an everincreasing prison population—namely, that too much of the overall
state and federal budgets were devoted to the costs associated with
imprisonment.7 Remarkably, broad support for prison decarceration
has been achieved. An unlikely advocate, President Trump, supported
many of the movement’s goals and signed the First Step Act into law
in 2018 with the goal of reducing the overall federal prison population
and promoting reentry programs.8
As the argument for prison abolition becomes increasingly more
cogent and mainstream, useful lessons can be taken from that
argument and applied in the context of immigration detention. This
Article seeks to do just that. If the U.S. can comfortably release
individuals from criminal detention while mitigating concerns about
flight risk and danger to the community, then surely it can do the
same for civil immigration detention. In fact, since individuals held in
immigration detention are held for pending civil matters rather than
criminal charges, the argument here is even stronger.9
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández provides the guiding text
for the abolition of immigration detention in his recent work
Migrating to Prison. In it, he lays out the theoretical framework and
logical underpinnings to support abolition. García Hernández admits
that there is not yet a clear plan or path forward for what might
successfully take the place of immigration detention. However, he
does note that successful programs so far have used a
“straightforward cocktail of support to increase compliance:
individualized education and legal representation combined with

7. See Shane Bauer, How Conservatives Learned to Love Prison Reform,
MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/
conservatives-prison-reform-right-on-crime/ (describing the “Right on Crime” prison
reform initiative led by fiscal conservative Newt Gingrich).
8. President Donald J. Trump is Committed to Building on the Successes of the
First Step Act, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 1, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.
gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-committed-building-successesfirst-step-act/; First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
9. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Abolish ICE . . . and Then What?, YALE L.J.F.
130, 141 (2019) (“There are large categories of undocumented immigrants who are both
potentially subject to deportation and eligible to obtain lawful status. . . . Immigration
authorities have a choice between two enforcement pathways: punish the
noncompliance through deportation, or allow the individual to come into compliance
by applying for permanent residence.”). Markowitz also contrasts the immigration
approach of ICE with that of other civil enforcement agencies such as OSHA, the FDA,
and the IRS, which have favored compliance over punishment. Id. at 138–41.
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community collaboration.”10 This Article hopes to build upon that
framework by advocating for universal representation as an initial
step toward abolition.
This Article utilizes Derrick Bell’s convergence theory11 to
demonstrate both that immigration detention abolition is possible and
explain practically how it might be accomplished. The proposal is that
individuals should be provided with free, public-defender style
representation in lieu of being detained during the pendency of their
immigration hearings. All funding that currently goes toward
immigration detention would be reallocated to local legal nonprofits
and public defender offices. These organizations would then provide
legal representation to those individuals who would have otherwise
been detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
during the pendency of their immigration proceedings. This
reallocation works to satisfy the purported rationale for immigration
detention: ensuring that individuals appear for their proceedings.
Functionally, it eliminates the cruel apparatus of immigration
detention, which separates families and harms those who are subject
to jail-like conditions for a lack of civil status. Importantly, providing
legal representation is a more cost-effective way to satisfy the
government’s goal of having individuals appear at their hearings. This
fiscal argument provides a rationale that can span ideological
differences. Last, legal representation results in an important positive
externality: individuals who are represented by a skilled legal
representative are significantly more likely to obtain relief that is
available to them. While not adhering to a strict abolitionist ethic, this
proposal works to further the goals of abolition by removing funding
from a harmful system that targets individuals of color and
reallocating it to local organizations that are tailored to support those
same communities as they confront a complex and confusing system.
Anticipated critiques of this Article revolve around the idea that a
universal representation program would result in complicity in a
system that is attempting to exclude and remove massive numbers of
immigrants from the United States. It is true that this practical
approach does not align exactly with all the goals and methods put

10. CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON 153
(2019).
11. Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518–33 (1980) (arguing that policy changes are possible
only when the proposed outcome of those policy changes align with the interests of the
majority white population).
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forth by many abolition scholars.12 However, this Article’s proposal
aims to reach one specific goal of abolition: reducing or completely
eliminating the number of people who are in immigration detention.13
Therefore, it clearly furthers the decarceral goals of abolition.
Moreover, it comports with the idea of tearing down one structure and
building up a different supportive structure in its place. Here, all
funding that goes toward supporting immigration detention would
instead by reallocated to local non-profits and public defender offices.
This funding shift fits within the abolition ethic, as does the ultimate
outcome of the proposal: the elimination of immigration detention.
Defunding the current institution and reallocating funds to a new
system more within the control of the local communities affected is
exactly the solution called for by the abolition movement.
Part I of this Article outlines and broadly describes the harm of
immigration detention, both to the individuals who are confined and
to their families and communities who suffer from their absence. Part
II briefly articulates the premise of immigration detention and its
alleged purpose. Part III describes one response that has been used to
counteract and alleviate the harm caused by immigration detention:
the implementation of successful universal representation programs
in various local non-profit and public defender organizations. Part IV
confirms that, despite the benefits of universal representation
programs in immigration detention centers, and apart from other
proposals for how to reduce the harm of immigration detention, the
goal should still be abolition of the immigration detention system.
Part V proposes that universal representation itself can be used as a
practical step toward abolition, specifically by relying on convergence
theory and utilizing a broadly appealing argument about fiscal
sensibility. In conclusion, universal representation is itself a potential
12. See Allegra McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and its
Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 173–78 (2012) (echoing the work of Ruth
Wilson Gilmore, Angela Davis, and many others, proposing a re-evaluation of the
policy goals of immigration policy and suggesting a dedicated focus toward economic
development and the recognition of the human rights and inherent dignity of all
persons); see also McLeod supra note 3, at 1161 (explaining how these principles relate
back to the prison abolition movement).
13. See, e.g., Dianne Solis, Immigration Detention Centers Are Emptying Out as
the U.S. Cites Coronavirus for Removals, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 2, 2020, 12:47
PM)
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/immigration/2020/10/02/immigrationdetention-centers-are-emptying-out-as-the-us-cites-coronavirus-fordeportations/?utm (discussing the drastic pandemic-related reduction of persons
detained by ICE); see also Denise L. Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive
Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 182–83
(2016) (finding that release from immigration detention often depends on arbitrary
factors such as available bed space).
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first practical step toward abolition that can find support in both
liberal and conservative audiences.
I. IMMIGRATION DETENTION IS HARMFUL
For decades, the perception of immigration detention as a nonpunitive, civil measure to ensure attendance at future immigration
hearings has persisted. However, its status as “non-punitive” has been
rightfully critiqued.14 Regardless of whether it is intended to be
punitive or not, immigration detention is harmful on a broad scale. It
separates families, imprisons asylum seekers, and subjects a massive
number of people—including U.S. citizens15—to dehumanization.
That so many individuals are deprived of their liberty, and arguably
due process, while under the guise of a non-punitive civil process is
troubling.
Immigration detention centers are prisons.16 Despite their civil
legal status, and notwithstanding attempts by the Trump
administration to label detention centers in a cheery fashion,17
immigration detention causes real harm.18 It is physically harmful
because of its harsh conditions, lack of adequate physical and mental
health care, and, most recently, its ability to quickly spread
contagious disease among an already vulnerable population.19
14. See Annie Flanagan, Note, Resisting Racialized Immigration Enforcement
through Community Bond Funds, 11 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSPS. 45, 50
(2019) (describing similarities between civil immigration detention and criminal
incarceration); see also Danielle C. Jefferis, Private Prisons, Private Governance: Essay
on Developments in Private-Sector Resistance to Privatized Immigration Detention, 15
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y. 82, 82–97 (2019).
15. See, e.g., Paige St. John & Joel Rubin, ICE Held an American Man in Custody
for 1,273 days. He’s Not the Only One Who Had to Prove his Citizenship, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-citizens-ice-20180427htmlstory.html (describing the stories of nearly 1,500 individuals who had been
arrested by ICE and then later released based on evidence that DHS admitted “tended
to show that the individual may, in fact, be a U.S. citizen”).
16. Altaf Saadi et al., Understanding US Immigration Detention: Reaffirming
Rights and Addressing Social-Structural Determinants of Health, 22 HEALTH AND
HUMAN RIGHTS J. 187, 189 (2020) (“The immigration detention system . . . operates
under civil law. . . . [D]etention conditions are often like those of prisons or jails.”).
17. Maria Sacchetti, ICE’s Chief Called Family Detention ‘Summer Camp.’ Here’s
What it Looks Like Inside., WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2019, 8:23 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/the-head-of-ice-called-familydetention-summer-camp-heres-what-it-looks-like-inside/2019/08/25/8f32609e-c67911e9-b5e4-54aa56d5b7ce_story.html.
18. Saadi et al., supra note 16, at 189 (describing reports of civil- and humanrights abuses, including preventable in-custody deaths).
19. See, e.g., Solis, supra note 13.
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Immigration detention separates family members, otherizes and
dehumanizes20 those who are held there for any period of time, and is
ultimately a costly burden on the U.S. government and its taxpayers.
Its existence further mars the United States’ weakened reputation for
fairness and justice. Its elimination is a necessary measure. Abolition
is possible and achievable. The first practical step in that process
could be the assignment of counsel in removal proceedings. But first,
a discussion of immigration detention’s harm is necessary.
A. Conditions of Detention: Harm to Those Who Are Detained
Abuses in detention centers are frequent.21 The effect on the
mental health of detainees is well-documented. A report exploring the
psychological effects of detention noted that, “[t]he nature of
immigration detention, compounded by the uncertainty of its length,
is regarded as a major contributing factor to mental deterioration,
despondency, suicidality, anger, and frustration.”22 This “systematic
review of the mental health implications of detaining asylum seekers
found that studies consistently supported an association between the
experience of immigration detention practices and poor mental
health.”23 Such a result is unsurprising given that many individuals
held in immigration detention centers are pursuing asylum cases,
meaning they are actively fleeing harm in their home countries.24
Many may have suffered a similar fate of confinement, mistreatment,
20. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as
Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349–50 (2014) (arguing that, in the context of
the “war on drugs” beginning in the 1980s, both “immigration and criminal
confinement were intended to stigmatize and penalize those who engage in drug
activity”).
21. See, e.g., Andrea Castillo & Paloma Esquivel, California Police Got Hundreds
of Calls About Abuse in Private ICE Detention Centers. Cases Were Rarely Prosecuted,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/202010-18/california-police-immigration-detention-abuse?utm; see also Tanvi Misra,
Immigrants Punished for Not Cleaning Detention Center, Court Papers Suggest, ROLL
CALL (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:21 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/10/14/immigrantspunished-for-not-cleaning-detention-center-court-papers-suggest/.
22. Kalina M. Brabeck et. al., Immigrants Facing Detention and Deportation—
Psychological and Mental Health Issues, Assessment, and Intervention for Individuals
and Families, in NEW DEPORTATIONS DELIRIUM: INTERDISCIPLINARY RESPONSES 167,
171 (Daniel Kanstroom & M. Brinton Lykes eds., 2015).
23. Id. at 171.
24. Marouf, supra note 4, at 2151 (“For people fleeing human rights violations in
their own countries, the experience of being detained can inflict particularly severe
emotional harm, re-traumatizing them and exacerbating existing mental illnesses,
such as posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and major depression.”).
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and dehumanization before coming to the United States. Finding
themselves in identical circumstances after making an arduous trek
to seek safety, it is no wonder that many experience negative mental
health effects from detention.
Though detention centers are required to adhere to certain
standards, they regularly fail to do so.25 In a recent report by
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) own Office of the Inspector
General, all four inspected facilities revealed violations of ICE’s own
standards, which are typically considered lax. Immediate risks or
egregious violations of detention standards at facilities in Adelanto,
California and Essex County, New Jersey included nooses in detainee
cells, overly restrictive segregation, inadequate medical care,26
unreported security incidents, and significant food safety issues.27
This neglect and inadequacy in detention centers has resulted in the
frequent deaths of detainees. In the 2019–2020 fiscal year, 17
immigrants died while in ICE custody.28 Over 200 detainees have died
in ICE custody since 2004.29 A recent report found that many of these
deaths are the result of failing to adequately evaluate and record

25. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-19-47, CONCERNS ABOUT ICE DETAINEE
TREATMENT AND CARE AT FOUR DETENTION FACILITIES (2019); see also Nick Miroff,
Immigrants Held at Md. Jail Were Excessively Strip-Searched, According to DHS
Inspector General, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2020, 10:10 PM) ( “Guards at a Maryland jail
strip-searched immigrant detainees after they met with their attorneys, attended
chapel or went anywhere outside their dormitory area, a practice that federal
authorities say was excessive and violated U.S. detention policies . . . .”).
26. See José Olivares & John Washington, “A Silent Pandemic”: Nurse At ICE
Facility Blows The Whistle on Coronavirus Danger: Irwin Detention Center, run by
LaSalle Corrections, has refused to test detainees and underreported Covid-19 cases,
the nurse says, THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 14, 2020, 10:24 AM), https://theintercept.com/
2020/09/14/ice-detention-center-nurse-whistleblower/ (describing allegations that
hysterectomies were regularly performed on detainees without their consent); see also
Letter from Project S. Inst. for the Elimination of Poverty & Genocide to Joseph V.
Cuffari, Inspector Gen., Off. of the Inspector Gen. (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://www.scribd.com/document/476013004/OIG-Complaint (same).
27. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 25 (detailing detention facility
violations including expired food, improper segregation, failure to provide recreation,
inadequate bathrooms, inadequate clothing and hygiene, and failure to allow inperson visitation).
28. Daniella Silva, 17th Immigrant Dies in ICE Custody, Twice as Many as Last
Fiscal Year, NBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2020, 12:19 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/17th-immigrant-dies-ice-custody-twice-many-last-fiscal-year-n1236152.
29. 8 People Died in Immigration Detention in 2019, 193 Since 2004, CATO INST.
(Jan. 8, 2020), cato.org/blog/8-people-died-immigration-detention-2019-193-2004; see
also Detainee Death Reporting, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/
detainee-death-reporting (last updated Dec. 14, 2021).
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patient care, leading to unnecessary death and suffering.30 ICE
regularly obfuscates31 and attempts to vilify those who perish in its
custody.32
Another major concern about housing many individuals in civil
custody is the exposure to various pathogens and illnesses. This has
been made manifest by the uncontrolled spread of COVID-19 in
several ICE facilities.33 A recent study found that “[i]mmigrants
detained by [ICE] are at increased risk of contracting COVID-19 due
to over-inflated jail populations, decreased access to medical care, and
inadequate sanitation and hygiene.”34 An ICE detention center in
Farmville, Virginia had an outbreak so severe that nearly every
detainee tested positive for the virus, and a federal lawsuit prevented
the transfer in or out of any additional individuals.35 Such outbreaks
30. Darius Tahir, Black Hole of Medical Records Contributes to Deaths,
Mistreatment at the Border, POLITICO (Dec. 01, 2019, 6:52 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/01/medical-records-border-immigration074507.
31. See AM. C.L. UNION ET AL., FATAL NEGLECT: HOW ICE IGNORES DEATHS IN
DETENTION 1–28 (2020), https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/
reports/Fatal%20Neglect%20ACLU-DWN-NIJC.pdf (“[E]ven in the eight cases where
[ICE Office of Detention Oversight] death reviews concluded that violations of ICE
medical standards contributed to people’s deaths, ICE’s deficient inspections system
essentially swept those findings under the rug.”).
32. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Immig. & Customs Enforcement, Canadian Man
in ICE Custody Passes Away in Virginia (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.ice.gov/news/
releases/canadian-man-ice-custody-passes-away-virginia (exhibiting ICE’s inclusion
of a deceased detainee’s criminal convictions in its press release).
33. The Seton Hall University School of Law Immigrants’ Rights and
International Human Rights Clinic noted the spread of COVID-19 in a recent report.
As of April 17, 2020, [ICE] reported that 124 detainees in its
custody, across at least 25 detention centers, had tested positive for
COVID-19, as well as 30 detention center employees and
personnel.” Importantly, “ICE does not count detainees being
treated at hospitals or third-party contractors working at ICE
facilities in reporting confirmed cases, nor does ICE report how
many people at its facilities have been tested or are being monitored
for the virus.
HAFSA S. MANSOOR & KATHERINE COMLY, A LONG TIME COMING: HOW THE
IMMIGRATION BOND AND DETENTION SYSTEM CREATED TODAY’S COVID-19
TINDERBOX 2 (2020), https://law.shu.edu/docs/publications/clinics/howimmigration-bond-and-detention-system-created-todays-covid-19tinderbox.pdf.
34. Id. at 1.
35. Antonio Olivo, House Committee Seeks Records in Coronavirus Outbreak
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are easily preventable.36 In fact, “[a] significant cause of the present
COVID-19 threat to immigrant detainees is the overcrowding of
detention centers [brought on] by the decades of immigration and
bond policies that . . . use[] a criminal carceral response to civil
immigration concerns.”37 ICE demonstrates either a staggering level
of unpreparedness or else complete negligence in its approach to this
issue. Despite concerns that detention would be a tinderbox, ICE took
few precautions in its facilities and engaged in a reckless number of
transfers which resulted in actively spreading the contagion. A report
found that in “the third week of March, ICE reported that there were
no ‘confirmed’ cases of COVID-19 in its detention system,” despite the
fact they were not actually testing but by June 15, ICE reported that
2,059 detainees had tested positive.38 While ICE has released a
significant number of detainees it considered vulnerable to COVID-19
and its effects, 39 this begs the question: Why was it necessary for
these individuals to be in ICE detention in the first place?40
B. Harm to Families
Immigration detention is also harmful to families. Detention, by
nature, separates an individual from larger society and, frequently,
from close family members and relations. The Trump administration
brought this issue to the forefront with its family separation policies.
Inside Virginia Immigrant Detention Center, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/house-committee-seeksrecords-in-covid-19-outbreak-inside-virginia-immigrant-detentioncenter/2020/08/07/9a8186d6-d8da-11ea-aff6-220dd3a14741_story.html.
36. See, e.g., Antonio Olivo & Nick Miroff, ICE Flew Detainees to Virginia so the
Planes Could Transport Agents to D.C. Protests. A Huge Coronavirus Outbreak
Followed, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
coronavirus/ice-air-farmville-protests-covid/2020/09/11/f70ebe1e-e861-11ea-bc79834454439a44_story.html?arc404=true&_=ddid-2-1599836400.
37. MANSOOR & COMLY, supra note 33, at 6.
38. DONALD KERWIN, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD., IMMIGRANT DETENTION AND
COVID-19: HOW THE US DETENTION SYSTEM BECAME A VECTOR FOR THE SPREAD OF
THE PANDEMIC 3 (2020), https://cmsny.org/publications/immigrant-detention-covid/.
39. Matt Katz, ICE Releases Hundreds Of Immigrants As Coronavirus Spreads
in Detention Centers, NPR (Apr. 16, 2020, 12:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/16/835886346/ice-releases-hundreds-ascoronavirus-spreads-in-detention-centers.
40. See Heroes Act, H.R. 6800, 116th Cong. § 191205 (as passed by House, May
15, 2020) (requiring DHS to review the immigration files of all persons during the
current public health emergency to assess the need for continued detention, and
requiring ICE to prioritize non-mandatory detainees for release); see also KERWIN,
supra note 38.
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However, family separation is an ongoing issue for children, partners,
and other family members who have a loved one in detention.41
Separation can result in psychological trauma, financial stress, poor
physical health, and other disruptions in the daily lives of families in
the United States. Importantly, these detention policies affect many
mixed-status families, meaning that U.S.-citizen children and
partners of detained individuals were harmed because of Trump-era
immigration detention policies.42 Such harm is unnecessary and can
be alleviated through a process of abolition.
As mentioned above, the most illustrative example of harm to
families was the Trump Administration’s decision in the summer of
2018 to criminally charge adults with illegal entry into the United
States, and as a result, funneling them through a system which
resulted in the mass separation of nearly 3,000 children from their
parents or caregivers.43 While the summer of 2018 resulted in outcry
from the public and an eventual cessation to this policy, a lawsuit filed
by the American Civil Liberties Union discovered that these
separations had actually begun in July 2017.44 Moreover, a current
analysis shows that, during the Trump Administration, over 5,400
children were separated from their families.45 While this issue has
risen to prominence in the public view, the harm inflicted on families
is much broader in its reach.
Another example of how family separation might occur in an
equally harmful way is to look at the August 7th, 2019, workplace raid
41. Marouf, supra note 4, at 2154 (“Approximately 4.5 million U.S. citizen
children have a parent who is in the country without legal immigration status. These
children live in a state of constant uncertainty about their lives.”).
42. Id. (“The financial stress that detention inflicts on a family can also lead to
instability in housing and in caregiving arrangements, which further exacerbates
emotional harm.”).
43. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION’S FAMILY SEPARATION POLICY: TRAUMA, DESTRUCTION, AND CHAOS
7, 18–20 (2020); Associated Press, More than 5,400 Children Split at Border, According
to New Count, NBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019, 4:58 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/
us-news/more-5-400-children-split-border-according-new- count-n1071791; see also
Julia Ainsley & Jacob Soboroff, Lawyers say they can’t find the parents of 545 migrant
children separated by Trump administration, NBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2020, 5:52 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/lawyers-say-they-can-t-find-parents545-migrant-children-n1244066?utm (exemplifying the egregiousness of this policy
through the fact that, as of October 21, 2020, nearly 545 children had still not been
reunited with their parents).
44. Family Separation Under the Trump Administration—A Timeline, S.
POVERTY L. CTR. (June 17, 2020), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2020/06/17/familyseparation-under-trump-administration-timeline.
45. See Associated Press, supra note 43.
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of a local chicken processing plant in Morton, Mississippi. This
resulted in the arrest of 342 people and was part of a larger raid
throughout Mississippi in which a total of 680 people were arrested.46
While the actual arrests of the plant workers were incredibly
traumatic,47 the fallout from this operation has led to diffuse trauma
throughout the small community in Mississippi. One of the workers
recounted how her three children remained at home while she was in
ICE detention for forty-nine days, waiting for a bond before being
released. She explained that her 6-year-old son struggles the worst,
saying “[w]henever I leave the house, my little boy worries if I’ll come
home[.]”48 In a study of similar workplace raids, approximately 500
children were left in the care of others with little to no information on
the whereabouts of their parents.49 Researchers have found that this
“sudden disappearance of a family member” has traumatic effects on
migrants who have “experienced state-sponsored kidnapping and
murders in their countries of origin . . . .”50 The long-term effects on
the children “include[] anxiety, withdrawal, anger/aggression,
clinginess, developmental difficulties (e.g., speech delay), and
behavioral and academic decline at school.”51
Research has shown that unauthorized migrants experience great
stress as they attempt to craft a life for their families in the United
States without work authorization. In fact, “parent legal status is a
predictor of multiple adverse outcomes for children, including
emotional well-being,” and “[c]hildren of unauthorized migrants are
more likely to report anxiety, fear, sadness, post-traumatic stress
symptoms, anger, and withdrawal.”52 This stress extends to the other
family members of detained immigrants.53 Separation creates anxiety
46. See Ari Shapiro, Months After Massive ICE Raid, Residents of a Mississippi
Town Wait and Worry, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.npr.org/
2019/11/17/778611834/months-after-massive-ice-raid-residents-of-a-mississippitown-wait-and-worry.
47. See id. (describing one worker’s fear that the ICE agents were terrorists
following a recent racially-motivated mass shooting).
48. Id.
49. Kalina M. Brabeck, Katherine Porterfield & Maryanne Loughry, Immigrants
Facing Detention and Deportation: Psychosocial and Mental Health Issues,
Assessment, and Intervention for Individuals and Families, in THE NEW
DEPORTATIONS DELIRIUM: INTERDISCIPLINARY RESPONSES 172 (Daniel Kanstroom &
M. Brinton Lykes eds., 2015).
50. Id. at 172–73.
51. Id. at 173.
52. Id. at 170.
53. See, e.g., Chris Outcalt, When a Family Separation Becomes Permanent,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 2, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/08/ice-
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and uncertainty leads to stress. The data is clear that immigration
detention is harmful to families.
C. Otherization
Another harmful effect of immigration detention is that it is
supported by and sustains the otherization of non-white individuals.54
While immigration detention extends back to the origins of
immigration law itself, and past administrations are certainly not
without blame, the Trump-era policy of widespread immigration
detention has bolstered the notion that, in general, people of color
should be viewed with skepticism and disdain.55 This question of who
belongs to a society and who can demonstrate their membership in
that society is not a new one.56 However, the Trump administration’s
many policy choices, including the decision to eliminate enforcement
priorities in immigration proceedings, has created space for the
continued marginalization of our most vulnerable populations.
Finally, the rhetoric endorsing these policies has invited our most
abhorrent perspectives about tribalism and fear, while
simultaneously promoting the theory that non-white individuals and
most immigrants are responsible for many perceived ills and
wrongdoings within American society.57

family-separation-death/614335/ (describing the story of Arri Woodson-Camara, who
committed suicide in April 2019 after being separated from her detained husband for
265 days).
54. See Kelly Lytle Hernández, Amnesty or Abolition: Felons, Illegals, and the
Case for a New Abolition Movement, BOOM J. CALI., Winter 2011, at 54, 65 (“Since the
era of emancipation, the rise of immigration control and mass incarceration has
created a racialized caste of outsiders within the United States.”).
55. See ELIZABETH BROWN & GEORGE BARGANIER, RACE AND CRIME:
GEOGRAPHIES OF INJUSTICE 333 (2018) (“Prisons are, in effect, systems of
dehumanization, working to exclude their inhabitants from the category of human.”);
see also The Discriminatory and Broken Criminal Justice System Has Cascading
Immigration
Consequences,
IMMIGRANT
JUST.
NETWORK
(2018),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/criminal_racial_justice_backgrounde
r_final1.pdf (“Although only 7% of non-citizens are black they represent 20% of people
in deportation proceedings on criminal grounds.”).
56. See Hernández, supra note 54, at 57 (noting that “the foundation for the
rights and status of persons coming to be known as ‘illegal aliens’ in the United States
was established” in two late-nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions: Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) and Fong v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)).
57. See generally NATALIA MOLINA, HOW RACE IS MADE IN AMERICA:
IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE HISTORICAL POWER OF RACIAL SCRIPTS (2014)
(discussing the history of racialized scripts and the reconstitution of these scripts for
application to newcomers to the United States).
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Otherization is a philosophical theory that describes the centering
of the individual or collective self and ascribes undesirable
characteristics to those who fall outside of the centered group.58 This
results in the creation of a “subaltern”—a group that is disfavored and
traditionally subjugated or subordinate in some way to the centered
group.59 This philosophical approach creates unity by dehumanizing
others through the creation of an “in group” and an “out group,” best
displayed by President Trump’s statements shortly after his election,
describing the alleged danger that immigrants present to U.S.
citizens: “They come from Central America. They’re tougher than any
people you’ve ever met. . . . They’re killing and raping everybody out
there. They’re illegal. And they are ﬁnished.”60 As Emily Ryo explains,
“these and similar remarks by Donald Trump have . . . helped propel
him onto the national stage by activating people’s deep-seated fears
about immigrants.”61 She notes that, “[i]nvocations of immigrant
criminality play a powerful role in U.S. politics despite the wellestablished empirical evidence that shows that immigrants, including
undocumented immigrants, are signiﬁcantly less likely to engage in
crime than the native-born population.”62
This rhetoric is based on the ideological formations of fear and has
been the cause for an increase in immigration detention.63 It is a
manifestation of the fact that the majority of white Americans cannot
imagine themselves in the shoes of immigrants.64 This results in, at
least, a lack of empathy and, at most, angry antagonism. The
58. See e.g., Allison Mountz, The Other, in KEY CONCEPTS IN POLITICAL
GEOGRAPHY 328 (Carolyn Gallaher et al. eds., 2009); OXFORD COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY, 637 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995).
59. See e.g., García Hernández, supra note 2, at 288–89 (describing parallels
between the ongoing stigmatization of migrants of color and the post-9/11 targeting of
Arab and Muslim populations by the FBI and INS).
60. Emily Ryo, Predicting Danger in Immigration Courts, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
227, 227 (2019) (citations omitted).
61. Id. (citations omitted)
62. See id.
63. See ALINA DAS, NO JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS, 162–63 (1st ed. 2020)
(describing President Trump’s characterization of an immigrant who unintentionally
shot a woman as an “animal,” and noting that such moments have “fueled the growth
of America’s crime-based deportation machine”); see also Jean Guerrero, The Man Who
Made Stephen Miller, POLITICO (Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/
magazine/2020/08/01/stephen-miller-david-horowitz-mentor-389933 (“Fear is a much
stronger and more compelling emotion . . . . Republicans should appeal to voters’ base
instincts.”).
64. See e.g., García Hernández, supra note 2, at 283–84 (contending that the
vilification of immigrants is deep-rooted in America’s racist attitudes toward minority
populations).
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dehumanization of migrants permits this otherization which in turn
lays the groundwork for civil detention to become the monstrous thing
that it is today.65
At this time, real harm is being perpetrated against real people
under the guise of some hypothetical security measures that imagines
and assigns terroristic ambitions to regular people. In reality, this
system of detention inflicts actual terror against those same people.
Claudia Rankine condensed this perspective neatly in her book
Citizen: An American Lyric with the line:
because white men can’t
police their imagination
black men are dying.66
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández discusses this sentiment in
his book Migrating to Prison, saying “[w]e need to stop demanding
that migrants be exceptional and instead embrace their
ordinariness.”67 He encourages embracing the concept that migrants
are “doing what people have done for millennia: moving from place to
place in search of comfort, safety, adventure—all that makes life
worth living.”68 García Hernández advocates that this ordinariness be
extended to the fact that, “[l]ike all of us, migrants mess up.”69 He
continues by confirming that areas with large migrant populations
are known for lower rates of both violent and property crimes, but also
shares that, “[s]ome migrants steal, and others hurt people. Denying
that reality is to hold migrants to an impossibly high bar.”70 Moreover,
he says, “[p]ointing to exceptionally talented and saintly migrants as
a model is a recipe for lumping mere mortals—that’s most of us—into
the category of undesirable arrivals.”71 His solution? “Let’s stop
sanctifying migrants and embrace the profound ordinariness that
makes migrants, like citizens, human.”72 As Morgan Parker states in
65. See id. at 286 (“The rhetoric framing immigration prisoners as criminals
disassociates prisoners from those who may influence their wellbeing, leading to
treatment of confined migrants as dangerous and disposable.”).
66. See CLAUDIA RANKINE, CITIZEN: AN AMERICAN LYRIC 134–35 (2014).
67. See GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 10, at 157.
68. Id. (providing three examples from the Abrahamic traditions: “In the
Christian tradition, trekking across the Earth begins with Adam and Eve’s fall from
grace. In Islam, it started with Muhammed’s search for safety. In Judaism, it is central
to the Jewish people’s survival.”).
69. Id. at 160.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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her anthology of poems, “I do everything right just in case…. [but] I
am a tree and some fruits are good and some are bad.”73 It is possible
to avoid the pitfalls of veneration and otherization by simply
empathizing and imagining oneself in the same position as those
vilified by the Trump administration.
II. PREMISE OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION
The current status quo of immigration detention is perplexing.
Over the past several decades, there has been an exponential increase
in the number of individuals held in immigration detention centers in
the United States.74 In 1955, there were only four individuals held in
immigration custody that were seeking entry into the U.S.75 In 2019,
the average U.S. immigrant detainee population was approximately
50,000 people.76 In 2020, the detained population was under 20,000
people and falling, largely due to self-imposed or judicially-required
mandates to stop the spread of COVID-19 in detention facilities.77 The
premise of immigration detention is that it is necessary to ensure the
future attendance of individuals at their removal proceedings and, in
some cases, that it is necessary to confine certain individuals because
they present a danger to the community.78 But, if that is the ultimate
purpose, there are two major problems: first, the current custody
73. MORGAN PARKER, THERE ARE MORE BEAUTIFUL THINGS THAN BEYONCÉ 4
(2017).
74. See René Lima-Marín & Danielle C. Jefferis, It's Just Like Prison: Is a Civil
(Nonpunitive) System of Immigration Detention Theoretically Possible?, 96 DENV. L.
REV. 955, 959–61 (2019).
75. Ana Raquel Minian, America Didn’t Always Lock Up Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/01/opinion/sunday/border-detentiontear-gas-migrants.html; see also, e.g., Herbert Brownell, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address at
American Council of Voluntary Agencies Committee on Migration and Refugee
Problems: Humanizing the Administration of the Immigration Law 2 (Jan. 26, 1955)
(“Under our new policy, aliens found to be unlawfully in the United States are now
released under conditional bond or parole or supervision while their deportation
proceedings are pending so long as they appear to be deserving of their personal
liberty.”).
76. Solis, supra note 13.
77. See id.; see also Rebecca Plevin, Judge Orders ICE to Reduce Population at
Adelanto Detention Center Amid COVID-19 Outbreak, DESERT SUN (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/2020/10/15/judge-orders-ice-reducepopulation-adelanto-detention-center-amid-covid-19-outbreak/3667578001/.
78. See Frances M. Kreimer, Dangerousness on the Loose: Constitutional Limits
to Immigration Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1485, 1488
(2012) (arguing that immigration detention has served “three historical purposes: (1)
to ensure the compliance of potential flight risks, (2) to neutralize potential national
security threats, and (3) to control future domestic crime”).
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determination regime is ill-equipped to address those concerns and is
problematic in its lack of consistency; and second, there are more
efficient and economical ways to address the two purported policy
concerns. This section provides a brief explanation of how the current
detention system functions, while critiquing the detention regime for
its inefficient, inhumane, and biased results.
A. Overview
Immigration detention has not always existed in the way that it
does now.79 As stated above, immigration detention began as an
allegedly non-punitive way to ensure that an individual would attend
future immigration hearings.80 It evolved to address concerns about
dangers to national security and, eventually, a new standard was
created that required an individualized determination about a
detainee’s dangerousness to be made prior to release.81 However,
these factors do not seem to be dispositive one way or the other when
drawing a conclusion about who will be detained by ICE or whether
ICE will release a person from their custody. Under scrutiny about
the spread of COVID-19 in its facilities, ICE has released nearly 60%
of its detained population, raising an alarming question: Why were
those more than 30,000 people in detention to begin with? But these
extralegal considerations are not new. In fact, ICE has both detained
and released individuals from immigration detention solely based on
the available bed space in its facilities.82 Apart from the fact that
immigration detention is frequently divergent from its purported
rationale, even when it does function in the way that it is intended it
produces problematic results.

79. See Flanagan, supra note 14, at 49 (describing the progression of U.S.
immigration policy from the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).
80. See Raquel Minian, supra note 75 (“Detention was reserved for migrants who
were deemed likely to abscond or who posed a threat to national security or public
safety.”).
81. See HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45915, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 12 (2019) (discussing the implementation of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, which
required an immigration detainee to demonstrate that his or her release would not
“pose a danger to property or persons” and that he or she was “likely to appear for any
future proceeding”).
82. See Gilman, supra note 13, at 182.
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B. Pre-hearing Detention, Mandatory Detention, and
Abolition Applicability
This Article seeks to explain how immigration detention could be
eliminated. In order to do so, it is important to briefly explain the
different ways in which people are held in immigration detention.
This Article focuses primarily on those individuals being held in prehearing detention, meaning that a decision has yet to be made on the
merits of their cases, and there is an avenue by which he or she could
be permitted to remain in the United States. The two types of
individuals held in pre-hearing detention are: (1) Those subject to
mandatory detention,83 and (2) those subject to discretionary
detention under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 236 in
which ICE has decided to deny bond (or impose a prohibitively
expensive bond), thus preventing a non-citizen’s release from
immigration detention.84 Individuals may be held in mandatory
detention for a number of reasons, but scholars have continued to
question the purpose of mandatory detention, its rationale, and the
mechanisms through which it is effectuated.85 For example, “arriving
aliens,”86 who are seeking relief from removal through a fear-based
application, such as asylum, are typically eligible for release only at
83. See e.g., Marouf, supra note 4, at 2146–47 (critiquing DHS’s interpretation of
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act relating to mandatory detention).
84. See Gilman, supra note 13, at 166 for an incredibly helpful chart detailing all
of the different ways that an individual may end up in immigration detention during
the pendency of their removal proceedings. Other scholars have addressed the harm
imposed by mandatory detention and have advocated for remedies to prevent such
harm. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A
Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal
Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2008) (exploring the tension between the
firmly established civil label on immigration proceedings and the contrary experience
of people subject to proceedings); Mark Noferi, Making Civil Immigration Detention
“Civil,” and Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil Detention Paradigm, 27 J. C.R. &
ECON. DEV. 533, 543 n.60 (2014) (“The criteria for mandatory detention, such as the
determination of an ‘aggravated felony’ or ‘crime involving moral turpitude,’ are
extremely complicated, and can encompass minor conduct such as simple drug
possession or subway turnstile jumping.”).
85. See Marouf, supra note 4, at 2146–47. See generally Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling
Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601
(2010) (skeptically discussing the purpose of mandatory detention); Philip L. Torrey,
Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics, Profit, and the
Meaning of “Custody”, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879 (2015) (same).
86. This term, “arriving aliens,” is used in the statute. While the term “alien” is
both dehumanizing and linguistically inarticulate, it is used here for the sake of
familiarity among immigration scholars and to conform with the vernacular of the
statute.
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ICE’s discretion through a process known as “parole.”87 They are
primarily detained under § 235(b)(1) which requires their detention88
but permits parole if the individual’s release is in the public interest—
that is, they are neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.89
Individuals held for discretionary detention are detained under INA
section 236.90 They are first evaluated by ICE to determine whether
they are a flight risk or a danger to the community, and if denied bond
or release, they can request a review by an immigration judge through
a custody redetermination hearing.91 Regardless of how an individual
is detained, a government agency, whether the Department of
Homeland Security or the Department of Justice, through
immigration judges, is typically able to grant release when it deems it
appropriate.
While many scholars have written about how immigration
detention is, in fact, punitive, this Article will, despite many
misgivings, assume the premise that the Supreme Court and other
87. See Gilman, supra note 13, at 168 n.32 and accompanying text.
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (“Any alien subject to the procedures under
this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of
persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.”); 8 C.F.R. §
235.3(b)(2)(iii) (“An alien whose inadmissibility is being considered under this section
or who has been ordered removed pursuant to this section shall be detained pending
determination and removal[.]”); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(ii) (“Pending the credible fear
determination by an asylum officer and any review of that determination by an
immigration judge [IJ], the alien shall be detained.”); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(i)
(providing that an alien whose claim of being a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent
resident, asylee, or refugee cannot be verified “shall be detained pending review of the
expedited removal order under this section”).
89. 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b), 236.3(a). An alien’s continued detention is not
considered in the public interest if the alien establishes his or her identity to an
immigration officer and shows that he or she presents neither a flight risk nor a danger
to the community. See also 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d) (providing that, in deciding whether to
grant parole, agency officials may consider “relevant factors,” including whether there
are reasonable assurances that the alien will appear at all hearings and/or depart the
United States when required to do so; the alien’s community ties such as close relatives
with known addresses; and any agreement to reasonable conditions such as periodic
reporting requirements).
90. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1–236.6; see also Marouf, supra note 4, at 2148 (“[As of 2015,]
[t]wo-thirds of the people in immigration detention (25,000 out of 37,000) do not have
a final order of removal, which means that they may ultimately be allowed to remain
in the United States. Of these 25,000 individuals, approximately 15,000 have no
criminal record whatsoever.”).
91. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d). Under Subpart A of Section 236, an individual must
establish to the satisfaction of the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration
Appeals that he or she does not present a danger to property or persons. 8 C.F.R. §
236.1(c)(3); see also, e.g., In re Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102 (B.I.A. 1999); In re Guerra,
24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006).
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judicial bodies have so far asserted—that immigration detention is
civil in nature, and that its sole purpose should be to ensure
attendance at future hearings or to prevent harm to the community.92
In both decisions about whether to retain an individual in its custody,
ICE is supposed to make an individual determination about whether
the person is: (1) a danger to the community, or (2) a flight risk.
Therefore, to understand the detention regime, a brief explanation
will be provided below about what considerations are taken into
account when making a decision about dangerousness and flight risk.
It should be noted that immigration judges only have review of ICE’s
decision regarding “bond redeterminations,” which is when an
individual is being discretionarily held under section 236. Parole
denials are not reviewable outside of the agency, though blanket
denials have been subject to scrutiny and litigation in the federal
court system has resulted in some success in the form of review.93
Regardless, ICE typically has a presumption of detention.94 By
statute, ICE is permitted to release an individual on their own
recognizance, but such decisions are rare.95 Instead, the most frequent
92. One additional concern about detention is that the current bond framework
requires detainees to prove that they are neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(3). This burden shift inverts the traditional paradigm
used in criminal court proceedings. See, e.g., Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d 135 (D.
Mass. 2019) (showing how, in Massachusetts, the burden has shifted away from the
detainees and back to the state). For a full critique of both this requirement and an
argument for the shifting of burden to the government, see Class Action Complaint
and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Miranda v. Barr, 463 F. Supp. 3d 632 (D. Md.
2020) (Civil No. 20-1110).
93. See, e.g., Robert Moore, US Immigration Officers Accused of Refusing Parole
for Asylum Seekers, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/aug/22/ice-us-immigration-officers-accused-of-refusing-parole-for-asylumseekers (describing a lawsuit against ICE arising from blanket denials of
humanitarian parole). As a result of this lawsuit, many ICE field offices began
conducting individualized parole reviews, and in some cases, granting parole, but with
new and unorthodox conditions, such as an asylum seeker from Cuba who was granted
parole but was required to pay a $10,000 bond before ICE would release her. Others
are also being granted prohibitively expensive bonds. See Carmen Sesin, ‘Abuse of
Power’: Asylum-Seekers, Advocates Decry New Use of High Bond Fees as Condition of
Parole, NBC NEWS (June 16, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/abusepower-asylum-seekers-advocates-decry-new-use-high-bond-n1231066.
94. Gilman, supra note 13, at 171−74 (describing how this process subverts the
constitutional protections that are set in place for a similar bond process in the
criminal justice system where “[l]iberty is the norm, and deprivation of freedom is the
limited exception”).
95. Parole vs. Bond in the Asylum System, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/parole-vs-bond-asylum-system (“Despite
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path is for ICE to deny bond or issue a monetary bond, after which the
individual who remains detained will then seek review from a judge.96
Because immigration judge decisions are reviewable by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), there is more clarity about why and how
these decisions are made. Therefore, the question of what merits
dangerousness or being a flight risk is necessarily limited here to the
context of discretionary detention under section 236, but the
arguments can again be more broadly applied in support of finding
that the decision-making processes and analyses in these cases are
frequently flawed, biased, and arbitrary.
C. Current Forms of Release from Immigration Detention Are
Arbitrary and Biased
The guidelines for determining whether a respondent in removal
proceedings is likely to be a flight risk or danger to the community
rely on two cases: In re R-A-V-P- and In re Guerra.97 A variety of
factors may be considered and the immigration judge “may choose to
give greater weight to one factor over others[.]”98 In re R-A-V-P- also
states that “[t]he Immigration Judge is in the best position to analyze
these considerations[.]”99 But is the immigration judge in the best
position to do so? Such a broad variety of factors seem difficult to
contextualize in the setting of an immigration bond hearing, which
typically lasts only a few minutes. Moreover, the discretion provided
to immigration judges does little to identify a standard for
dangerousness or flight risk. In fact, research has shown that a
variety of extrinsic factors including race, ethnicity, and gender guide
judges’ determinations in criminal proceedings.100 For example,
studies have shown that “Hispanic males face the least favorable set
of outcomes throughout the pretrial release process and are the group
most likely to be detained” in criminal proceedings.101 In immigration
proceedings, the result is that “[t]he odds of being deemed dangerous
are about 68 percent higher for Central Americans than for nonhaving the legal authority to forgo setting a monetary bond, almost all immigration
judges do—most likely due to a misconception that they must impose a bond.”).
96. Id.
97. In re R-A-V-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 803 (B.I.A. 2020); In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec.
37 (B.I.A. 2006).
98. In re R-A-V-P-, 27 I. & N. at 804−05 (quoting In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at
40) (discussing In re Guerra and the factors affecting “dangerousness”).
99. Id. at 804.
100. Emily Ryo, Predicting Danger in Immigration Courts, 44 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 227, 231 (2019).
101. Id.
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Central Americans.”102 In addition, “[d]etainees with an attorney at
their bond hearings have about 47 percent lower odds of being deemed
dangerous than detainees who lack legal representation.”103
The federal government first established immigration detention
during the pendency of civil immigration proceedings to ensure that a
noncitizen would appear for future hearings.104 This rationale aligned
with historical methods that had been used in criminal-based
proceedings. Eventually, the permissible purpose of immigration
detention expanded and it became a potential tool to neutralize
alleged “national security” threats.105 This latter definition grew to
encompass a broader category of people—those who were considered
a “threat to the community.”106 This expansion and inclusion of the
“dangerousness” category has been readily critiqued as a punitive
measure that has been incorporated into a system that claims to be
non-punitive and has been adjudged by the Supreme Court to be nonpunitive.107 Moreover, questions about whether such considerations
are punitive, subjecting someone to detention after they have already
been subject to the authority of the criminal court system raises major
questions. This new system, created with the 1996 legislation,108
resulted in the creation of a “crimmigration” system which continues
to funnel migrants from one system to the other and builds support
for the narrative that there is some correlation between immigrants
and criminality, despite the fact that such a conclusion has been

102. Id. at 245–46 (discussing social and cognitive factors that may lead judicial
decisionmakers to assign stereotypes or biases to Central Americans).
103. Id. at 241, 246 (“[L]awyers advance personal or individuating information
about their clients that makes it difficult for immigration judges to engage in simple
heuristics or categorical thinking about detainees as dangerous criminals.”). The study
also confirmed that the odds of being deemed “dangerous” increased significantly with
each additional felony conviction or violent conviction. Id. at 241. However, this begs
the question about whether dangerousness should be considered in a non-criminal
bond hearing, when, presumably, the “criminal justice system” is specifically set up
for such a purpose.
104. Kreimer, supra note 78, at 1488.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1496−97.
107. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001); see also Lima-Marin
& Jefferis, supra note 74, at 964 (“The law may hold that civil immigration
confinement and punitive incarceration are distinct but, in the reality of the modern
civil immigration detention regime, it is a distinction with no difference.”)
108. García Hernández, supra note 20, at 1369–70.
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frequently disproved.109 Scholars continue to note the suspect nature
of this interaction.110
It seems, then, that the question of dangerousness is influenced
by biases and arbitrary inferences by immigration judges. Moreover,
when someone is denied bond by an immigration judge despite being
granted bond in their criminal proceedings, such an outcome is
counterintuitive. The criminal court has access to witnesses and
evidence, while an immigration judge typically relies on unfounded
assertions by DHS attorneys and second-hand evidence. The
complicated factoring system enumerated in In re R-A-V-P- supports
the notion that judges are ill-equipped to make decisions based on
dangerousness and flight risk.111 Moreover, dangerousness is a
determination best made in other courtrooms more proximate to the
alleged acts that causes the person’s arrest in the first place. Last,
ICE is an enforcement arm that has demonstrated its desire to detain
as many individuals as possible. Its own internal decision-making is
difficult to trust as the annual average number of individuals
detained continues to climb.
In conclusion, the problems with the dangerousness and flight risk
factors are many. First, there is a presumption of detention. It is the
immigrant’s burden to prove that they will be neither a flight risk nor
a danger to the community.112 Second, proving a negative is difficult
to do—thus it is easy to see why the BIA has created a contorted set
of metrics to try to fill in the blanks. The perverse irony here is that
it is the migrant’s burden to prove a lack of dangerousness, while in
the criminal context, the presumption for that individual is release
and it is the state who must prove that the accused is a flight risk or
a likely danger.113 Last, dangerousness was not always a factor in
bond proceedings. It was added as a factor in the mid-1990s in the
throes of the “tough on crime” approach, but such an approach is
109. See, e.g., Alina Das, Inclusive Immigrant Justice: Racial Animus and the
Origins of Crime-Based Deportation, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 171, 194 (2018) (Racial
animus towards immigrants, first Chinese and then Mexican, explains in large part
the impetus for the creation of the first immigration crimes.”); Anna Flagg, Is There a
Connection Between Undocumented Immigrants and Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/upshot/illegal-immigration-crime-ratesresearch.html.
110. Hernández, supra note 54, at 62 (tracing the historical roots of the linguistic
and psychological shift from “migration control” to “crime control”).
111. In re R-A-V-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 803, 804–05 (B.I.A. 2020) (stating that “[t]he
Immigration Judge is in the best position to analyze these considerations[,]” and
noting that the complexity of the factoring system belies its point).
112. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8).
113. Gilman, supra note 13, at 192−94.
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inappropriate here, especially as the nation moves in a bipartisan way
to reduce the harmful effects of the “war on crime” movement. Given
that there has been a shift in the criminal context regarding bond, it
is appropriate that there would be a similar shift in immigration
proceedings.
III. THE SUCCESS OF UNIVERSAL REPRESENTATION
One response to the harms of immigration detention has been the
implementation of universal representation programs. This part of
the Article will provide more detail about how some of these programs
are already operating and will identify the additional benefits that
result from having legal representation in immigration proceedings.
Specifically, this section touches on the importance of representation
regarding case outcomes. It then focuses on how the current programs
might serve as a model for expansion and examines what funding
measures would be necessary to expand the programs. Finally, the
last portion of this section addresses potential critiques to universal
representation and concludes that it can still be implemented as a
successful policy notwithstanding those critiques.
A. Explanation of Universal Representation Programs
Systemic efforts have already been implemented in many
localities and have proven the efficacy of this program.114 The first of
these programs, known as the New York Immigrant Family Unity
Project (NYIFUP) began in 2013 as a pilot program, administered by
the various public defender and legal aid offices throughout the
boroughs.115 Due to its overwhelming success, it was scaled up to
represent nearly all detained individuals who are residents of New
York City.116 A similar project was developed in New Jersey shortly
thereafter through the Friends Representation Initiative of New
Jersey (FRINJ) at the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)
114. See, e.g., Kica Matos & Helen Gym, One Big Thing Cities Can Do on
Immigration,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
26,
2020,
11:57
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-26/one-big-thing-cities-can-do-toprotect-immigrants (noting that “[t]oday, there are nearly 40 jurisdictions across 18
states that provide lawyers to as many immigrants as possible facing deportation” and
that one poll found that 87% of people “support government-funded lawyers for people
in immigration court.”).
115. JENNIFER STAVE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK
IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY PROJECT 2 (2017), https://www.vera.org/publications/newyork-immigrant-family-unity-project-evaluation.
116. Id. at 3.
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in Newark, New Jersey.117 And it has been expanded into the
Detention and Deportation Defense Initiative (DDDI) administered
by Legal Services of New Jersey.118 Both the NYIFUP and the DDDI
projects have grown substantially from their initial pilot phases with
continued success.119 Similar efforts now have sprung up throughout
the country, most notably through the Vera Institute of Justice’s
SAFE Network.120
The purpose of these programs was to create a universal
representation program, or a randomized approximation of such a
program via pilot programs in response to low representation rates of
detained individuals.121 The outcomes of each program were clear
successes—the key finding being that, when someone has legal
representation in their removal proceedings, their likelihood of
obtaining relief increases between 300% and 1100%.122 One program
serving immigrants in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area found
that
Among detained immigrants without lawyers . . . ,
people in Arlington were only successful in their cases
11 percent of the time and unrepresented people in
Baltimore only successful 7 percent of the time. . . .
[H]aving a lawyer in Arlington more than doubled a
person’s chances of being able to remain in the U.S.
and quadrupled a person’s chance of obtaining relief in
Baltimore.123
117. N.J. COAL. FOR IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, LEGAL REPRESENTATION
KEEPS FAMILIES TOGETHER: FINDINGS FROM NEW JERSEY’S DETENTION AND
DEPORTATION DEFENSE INITIATIVE YEAR 3 (2020), https://www.afsc.org/sites/
default/files/documents/DDDI%20Report%207.29.2020.pdf.
118. Id. at 1.
119. Id. at 3.
120. The Vera institute worked to help structure the NYIFUP program, and also
assisted AFSC in much of its program design and data evaluation. STAVE ET AL., supra
note 115, at 5–6 (2017); see also Press Release, Vera Inst. of Just., SAFE Network
Expands to 18 Communities Fighting for Legal Representation for Immigrants Facing
Deportation (July 16, 2019), https://www.vera.org/newsroom/safe-network-expandsto-18-communities-fighting-for-legal-representation-for-immigrants-facingdeportation.
121. STAVE ET AL., supra note 115, at 5–6.
122. See LORI A. NESSEL & FARRIN ANELLO, SETON HALL L. CTR. FOR SOC. JUST.,
DEPORTATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: THE ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE CRISIS FACING
NEW JERSEY’S IMMIGRANT FAMILIES 2 (2016); see also STAVE ET AL., supra note 115,
at 5–6.
123. MAGGIE CORSER, THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
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Moreover, there is significant support for these types of programs,
and up to 87% of people in the United States support government
funding to provide attorneys to individuals in immigration court.124
The most important components of a universal representation
program are that they are: (1) truly universal—there are no exclusion
points except for income considerations and current representation by
other counsel,125 and (2) administered through local non-profits who
have already established successful programs in removal defense for
noncitizens.126
B. Successful Implementation of Universal Representation Programs
The NYIFUP program, initiated in 2013 as a pilot, expanded to
full representation in 2017.127 It is based primarily in New York City
and is a universal representation project for any New York resident
who is in immigration detention.128 The program has experienced
enormous success.129 On average, NYIFUP clients have been present
in the U.S. for 16 years before being placed in removal proceedings.130
ENSURING COUNSEL FOR IMMIGRANTS FACING DEPORTATION IN THE D.C.
METROPOLITAN AREA 1 (2017).
124. VERA INST. JUST., PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR
GOVERNMENT-FUNDED ATTORNEYS IN IMMIGRATION COURT (2020).
125. Some current programs, such as NYIFUP, have had their funding limited by
New York City councilmembers who have sought to exclude individuals with certain
convictions from the program. As a result, they have had to obtain funding elsewhere.
See Emma Whitford, Anonymous Donation Secures Immigrant Defense Funding
Without Restrictions, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 1, 2017), https://gothamist.com/news/
anonymous-donation-secures-immigrant-defense-funding-without-restrictions;
see
also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigrant Defense Fund for Utopians, 75
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1393, 1403 (discussing the exclusion of certain individuals with
criminal convictions from representation). See generally Lindsay Nash, Universal
Representation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 503 (2018) (providing foundational scholarship
on universal representation).
126. See García Hernández, supra note 125, at 1403.
127. STAVE ET AL. supra note 115, at 3.
128. For a more complete analysis of the NYIFUP program, see Talia Peleg &
Ruben Loyo, Transforming Deportation Defense: Lessons Learned from the Nation’s
First Public Defender Program for Detained Immigrants, 22 CUNY L. REV. 193, 197
(2019) (discussing how to move toward a successful Gideon-style public defender
system in the immigration context using the NYIFUP as an example).
129. See Evaluation of the New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, VERA INST.
OF JUST. (Nov. 2017), https://www.vera.org/publications/new-york-immigrant-familyunity-project-evaluation (providing the full report of the program cited in supra note
115 including summaries and methodological appendices).
130. STAVE ET AL., supra note 115, at 5.
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Nearly 1,600 lawfully present or U.S.-citizen children have had a
parent represented in the program.131 Simply having a NYIFUP
attorney has increased the likelihood of success in removal
proceedings from 4% (for those without counsel) to 48% (for those with
NYIFUP counsel): an increase of 1100%.132 As a result, an additional
$2.7 million in tax revenue will be paid by these individuals released
from detention, on an annual basis.133 Importantly, In New York’s
universal representation model, “only 10 of the 611 [or about 2% of]
NYIFUP clients released on bond received orders of removal in
absentia for failing to appear for a subsequent court date.”134
These results are stunning and, while they are limited to a highly
specific cohort, they demonstrate the benefits to families,
communities, and individuals that can result from a universal
representation program. It is also important to note how difficult it is
to represent someone in detention.135 The overall likelihood of success,
even when represented, is significantly lower when compared to the
likelihood of success for individuals who are not detained. 136
Therefore, it is likely that the probability of success would increase in
these cases if they were released from detention and represented.
The FRINJ project, mentioned above, started in early 2015 with
its own pilot, following the success of the NYIFUP program just across
the Hudson River.137 Based in Newark, the FRINJ project seeks to
represent all immigrant detainees who are New Jersey residents. 138
In 2018, due to the program’s success, the pilot was expanded, with
funding awarded to Legal Services of New Jersey (LSNJ) to provide
additional representation via funding directly from the state of New
Jersey.139 This program is now known as the Detention and

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
See JENNIFER STAVE ET AL., ADVANCING UNIVERSAL REPRESENTATION: A
TOOLKIT 20 n.30 (2018), https://www.vera.org/advancing-universal-representationtoolkit/the-case-for-universal-representation-1.
135. Nash, supra note 125, at 525 (explaining that “detained cases have generally
been perceived as more challenging for a range of reasons”).
136. Marouf, supra note 4, at 2151 n.57 and accompanying text (“Detention . . .
impairs the ability to mount a defense by making it difficult to obtain evidence from
the outside world. Given the number of obstacles that must be overcome, many
detainees simply give up and never file or abandon applications for relief.”).
137. See ANDREA BLACK & JOAN FRIEDLAND, NAT’L IMMIGRATION L. CTR.,
BLAZING A TRAIL: THE FIGHT FOR RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN DETENTION AND BEYOND
18−19 (2016).
138. N.J. COAL. FOR IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, supra note 117, at 3.
139. Id. at 1, 5.
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Deportation Defense Initiative.140 The state sponsored funding that
supports this program has increased between 2018 and 2020.141
Currently, the program has been allocated approximately $3 million
per year.142 A full implementation of the program would require $15
million annually.143 A recent report found that New Jersey employers
pay an estimated $5.9 million in annual turnover-related costs as they
are forced to replace detained or deported employees.144 Lost wages
for New Jersey’s workforce total $18 million annually due to
immigration detention, and $1.6 million in tax revenue is lost.145
There are also significant costs related to caring for children of
deported parent since 87.5% of children in New Jersey who have
immigrant parents are U.S. citizens themselves.146 The seminal study
in New Jersey found that individuals in detention avoided removal
49% of the time with counsel, compared to only 14% of the time
without counsel147, and a more recent report confirms that success
rates are now 50% or higher in both securing release from detention
and obtaining relief at a merit hearing before an immigration judge.148
If 50% of represented clients are getting out on bond and 50% of clients
who go to merit hearings are getting relief, this begs the question:
Why are we spending government funds to lock up individuals who
will ultimately merit relief?
Following the success of the NYIFUP and DDDI programs, the
Vera Institute has been working to replicate their universal
representation models throughout the United States through its
SAFE Network.149 Currently, there are eighteen jurisdictions
collaborating with VERA, mostly cities and counties in Texas,
California, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.150 With
140. See id. at 1.
141. Id.
142. Funding Increase For Immigrants’ Representation Means Keeping More
Families Together, AM. C.L. UNION-N.J. (July 1, 2019), https://www.aclu-nj.org/
news/2019/07/01/funding-increase-immigrants-representation-means-keeping-mor.
143. See AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., DUE PROCESS FOR ALL: PROMOTING ACCESS
TO JUSTICE FOR IMMIGRANTS IN NEW JERSEY 2 (2019).
144. Id. at 5.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 5–6.
147. NESSEL & ANELLO, supra note 122.
148. Monsy Alvarado, Advocates Push for $12M Boost in Legal Aid for N.J.
Immigrants Fighting Deportation, NORTHJERSEY.COM (July 29, 2020, 4:42 PM),
https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/new-jersey/2020/07/29/nj-advocates-push-12m-boost-state-program-fight-deportations/5534682002/.
149. SAFE Initiative, VERA INST., https://www.vera.org/initiatives/safe-initiative
(last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
150. Id.
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projects throughout the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West, it is no
surprise that public support for this type of funding is high. In fact, a
recent report from the Vera Institute states that 86% of likely voters
(including 76% who self-identity as Republicans and 73% of those who
voted for Trump in 2016) “support government-funded attorneys for
people in immigration court.”151 This support is striking and makes
clear that universal representation is a viable policy option for
politicians.
These individual examples have been confirmed by a study
looking at a larger, more comprehensive period, analyzing the
representation of over 1.2 million immigration removal cases decided
between 2007 and 2012.152 The authors of this study, Ingrid Early and
Steven Shafer, found that, compared to immigrants without
attorneys, immigrants with attorneys fared far better: among
similarly-situated removal respondents, “the odds were fifteen times
greater that immigrants with representation, as compared to those
without, sought relief, [and] five-and-a-half times greater that they
obtained relief from removal . . . .”153 In addition, “[r]epresented
respondents . . . were also more likely to be released from custody[,]”
and, once released, “were more likely to appear at their subsequent
removal hearings.”154 It is clear that universal representation is an
effective alternative to detention because it is nearly as effective as
detention, while being more cost-effective and morally justifiable than
detention.155 Moreover, it has the added benefit of a greater likelihood
of positive outcomes, which in turn result in community and family
stability.156
C. Expansion of Universal Representation Programs: Funding
One major question that remains is how to create a secure funding
source. The crux of this Article's argument is that the federal
government should take the money it is now spending on immigration
detention and divert it to fund local non-profits who can establish a
broad infrastructure of universal representation programs. Many of
the current representation programs receive their funding in part
151. See STAVE ET AL., supra note 115, at 1.
152. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015).
153. Id. at 57.
154. Id. at 75.
155. See id.
156. See Outcalt, supra note 53 for an example on how current immigration
policies affect family stability and mental health.
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from foundations and partially through local and state
governments.157 While such a model has proven to be viable,158 it
makes sense that the federal government should play a role in
ameliorating the harm that immigration detention has inflicted on so
many individuals and communities because immigration detention is
a function of the federal government.159 This Article, as it advocates
for the replacement of immigration detention with universal
representation programs, proposes a simple solution: the diversion
and reallocation of federal funds from payments to immigration
detention centers and private prisons to the coffers of various public
defender and legal services offices. These local legal services providers
would then have a dependable funding source through which to build
and support their universal representation programs.
In fact, the federal government has already implemented a similar
program, the National Qualified Representative Program (NQRP).160
This program was created to provide representation to individuals in
immigration detention who are deemed “incompetent” and found to be
unable to represent themselves, or that their pro se representation
would result in a process that was not fundamentally fair.161 Through
this program, local non-profits are identified who have experience
representing clients with mental health issues. The Department of
Justice then contracts with those providers to pay for the provision of
counsel to the individual in immigration detention who has been
found unable to represent themselves.162 A number of scholars have
provided training, commentary, and feedback about how the program
should be best implemented.163 There are a number of critiques and
157. See, e.g., BLACK & FRIEDLAND, supra note 137, at 18–19; STAVE, ET AL. supra
note 115, at 3.
158. See BLACK & FRIEDLAND, supra note 137, at 18–19; STAVE, ET AL. supra note
114, at 3.
159. See Marouf, supra note 4, at 2149 (discussing how much money the federal
government allocates to immigration); see also Kreimer, supra note 78, at 1488
(discussing the historical purposes of federal immigration detention).
160. DONALD KERWIN, ZOLBERG INST. ON MIGRATION & MOBILITY,
STRENGTHENING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM THROUGH LEGAL ORIENTATION,
SCREENING AND REPRESENTATION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION
1, 4 (2020).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices: The Due Process Rights of
Mentally Disabled Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373,
379–84 (2011); Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case for a Right to
Mental Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 998 (2014); Sarah
Sherman-Stokes, Sufficiently Safeguarded?: Competency Evaluations of Mentally Ill
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recommendations, but the main point is that a government-funded
program, implementing the provision of counsel via partnerships with
local non-profits, is not only feasible: it is already happening.164 The
next step would be to scale the project to encompass representation of
all individuals who would have otherwise been held in detention.
D. Potential Critiques to Universal Representation
Because this Article advocates for universal representation as an
inherent solution to the injustices wrought by immigration detention,
it is subject to many of the same criticisms directed at the public
defender system developed after Gideon v. Wainwright.165 While the
data are clear in that representation increases the likelihood of
attendance at immigration proceedings, there are still concerns about
the external effects of a universal representation program.166 The first
of those concerns is whether universal representation actually leads
to better outcomes in the substantive cases.167 The second critique is
that access to government-funded counsel is a due process right in
immigration hearings and the best way to access this right is through
litigation.168 Last, and perhaps most important, is the law-and-society
critique about whether such a universal representation system would
actually implicate itself as part of a system that is inherently flawed.
This last critique would contend that the immigration enforcement
system (which uses the hammer of removal proceedings as its only
tool) should be eradicated because of its oppression and
dehumanization of immigrants. Each is addressed in turn below.

Respondents in Removal Proceedings, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1058 (2016); Amelia
Wilson et al., Addressing All Heads of the Hydra: Reframing Safeguards for Mentally
Impaired Detainees in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 313, 340 (2015); Amelia Wilson & Natalie H. Prokop, Applying Method to the
Madness: The Right to Court Appointed Guardians Ad Litem and Counsel for the
Mentally Ill in Immigration Proceedings, 16 U. PA. J.L. SOC. & CHANGE 1, 15–19
(2013).
164. See National Qualified Representative Program (NQRP), THE U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/national-qualified-representativeprogram-nqrp.
165. 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
166. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 152, at 73–74.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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1. Is Universal Representation Beneficial?
The first anticipated critique raised here is whether a universal
representation program is as effective as it claims to be in promoting
successful outcomes in immigration hearings. Many of the reports by
the Vera Institute show that individuals with assigned or private
counsel tend to have a higher likelihood of success than when an
individual proceeds unrepresented before an immigration judge.169
However, other recent studies have perhaps found otherwise.170
Most notable is a recent report from the Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) from Syracuse University, which
monitors data on the various outcomes of immigration proceedings
throughout the country.171 Its June 2020 report on bond hearing
outcomes in immigration courts found that,
Despite the rising rate of representation, bond grant
rates have not improved. During [fiscal year] 2015 and
[fiscal year] 2016, immigration judges granted bond at
56 percent of these hearings. This fell to 50 percent
during [fiscal year] 2018. Since [fiscal year] 2018 grant
rates have fallen to 48 percent where they have
remained for the last three years.172
There are a number of reasons why this recent study might
demonstrate lower current bond grant rates while not necessarily
contradicting the fact that having counsel in immigration proceedings
typically will result in more favorable outcomes. First, the Trump
administration moved quickly and aggressively to promote and hire
immigration judges during the first two years of his tenure.173 As of
April 2019, the administration had appointed 190 immigration
judges, accounting for 43% of the current total.174 Past studies have
shown that, apart from whether an individual is represented, the
biggest predictor of success in an immigrant’s case is the judge to

169. See discussion infra Section V.C.
170. See Representation at Bond Hearings Rising but Outcomes Have Not
Improved, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 18, 2020),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/616.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Amy Taxin, Trump Puts His Stamp on Nation’s Immigration Courts, AP
NEWS
(July
23,
2019),
https://apnews.com/article/
50e97a112fb142f2abffa061ed5737d6.
174. Id.
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which the case is assigned.175 Second, the reviewability of bond
decisions has also been compromised by Trump’s efforts to push out
BIA members, appoint new, more hardline members in their place,
and expand the BIA so that he could continue to appoint judges with
low grant rates.176 This study also does not account for the other
important roles that attorneys might fill. For example, a Human
Rights First report from 2017 details several instances where
“advocacy by an attorney prevented [Customs and Border
Protection’s] wrongful deportation of an asylum seeker.”177 Simply
put, “[b]ringing a trained legal advocate to the immigration courtroom
is a significant improvement that cannot be overstated.”178
Importantly, the elimination of immigration detention would
abrogate the need for these bond hearings in the first place.
Another critique concerns the quality of the attorney representing
each client.179 A 2015 study found that, using data from 1990 to 2010,
“not being represented by legal counsel is actually better than being
represented by a poor lawyer and that variation in attorney capability
is a primary driver of the disparity in asylum outcomes in U.S.
immigration courts.”180 This study also found that, “[o]btaining an
attorney that specializes in immigration does not improve the
probability of a successful outcome . . . .”181 But importantly, this same
study also found that “[a]verage attorneys . . . are considerably better
than no representation” and, “[a] good immigration attorney . . . is on
average 32 percentage points better than an average one and about
40 percentage points better than no representation.”182 However, the
clear finding from this study was that “[b]eing unrepresented . . .
appears to make one more likely to receive relief than being
175. See JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN
ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 3 (2009). See generally Jaya
Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 295 (2007).
176. Noah Lanard, The Trump Administration’s Court-Packing Scheme Fills
Immigration Appeals Board With Hardliners, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/08/the-trump-administration-has-packedthe-immigration-appeals-board-with-hardliners/.
177. Lindsay M. Harris, Withholding Protection, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1,
55–58 (2019) (citing data from the CARA Pro Bono Project which suggests that
adequate access to counsel would mitigate against erroneous removals).
178. García Hernández, supra note 125, at 1420.
179. See e.g., Banks Miller et al., Leveling the Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal
Representation in Cases of Asymmetrical Capability, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 209, 209
(2015).
180. Id. at 209–10.
181. Id. at 227.
182. Id. at 229.
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represented by a poor attorney[,]”183 and, therefore, “having no
attorney is consistently more beneﬁcial than having a low-quality
attorney.”184 These findings do not contradict the possibility of a
successful universal representation project, but they do emphasize the
importance of identifying, training, and funding skilled lawyers.
Thus, these critiques are well-received, but, nonetheless, do not
overcome the merits of universal appointment of counsel. Simply
creating a universal representation project is not necessarily the only
tool needed to create a system which results in due process.185 Some
critics emphasize the importance of training and developing skilled
lawyers to understand and work within a complex immigration
system.186 This is part of the rationale for why current non-profits,
legal services organizations, and public defenders’ offices would be the
best location for the implementation of universal representation
projects for immigrants.
2. Due Process Arguments for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in
Immigration Proceedings
Much of the research regarding a universal public-defender style
program considers whether there is a Fifth or Sixth Amendment right
to counsel provided by the federal government. Those arguments are
outlined here, but this Article abstains from evaluating the merits of
each and, instead, proposes a change in policies. In doing so, this
Article seeks to serve as a complement to the well-established due
process considerations.
There have been a number of arguments articulating a right to
counsel both generally and for discrete groups.187 Many scholars have
183. Id.
184. Id. at 230.
185. For example, many have pointed to concerns that the current system of
immigration judges, because their authority falls under the administration of the
Department of Justice, and thus Executive authority, are not independent. To this
end, many scholars have called for the creation of an Article I court to help create an
independent judiciary and alleviate the political pressure that now exists within the
Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), and under which immigration judges
are now subject. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1665–66, 1678 (2010).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Developments in the Law–Representation in Removal Proceedings,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1659 (2013); LaJuana Davis, Reconsidering Remedies for
Ensuring Competent Representation in Removal Proceedings, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 123,
154–55 (2009); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
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voiced the need for a right to counsel for children in immigration
proceedings188 or for those seeking certain types of relief, such as
asylum.189 Others have advocated for a right to counsel for those found
to lack the mental competency to proceed pro se.190 Some have
suggested that intervention is necessary, prior to the initiation of
removal proceedings, for criminal defendants whose immigration
status may be affected by certain convictions or pleas.191 Other
scholars focus their arguments on the provision of counsel for lawful
permanent residents,192 detained lawful permanent residents,193 and
detained immigrants generally.194 Still others have focused on
affirming a general right to government appointed counsel due to the
complexity and high stakes of immigration proceedings.195 Many of
1299, 1358–60 (2011); Kevin Gardner, Note, Prisoners in the Face of Gladiators:
Providing a Sword and Shield to Aliens in Removal Proceedings Through CourtAppointed Counsel, 52 AKRON L. REV. 1189, 1220–21 (2018).
188. See, e.g., Linda Kelly Hill, The Right To Be Heard: Voicing the Due Process
Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 41, 44
(2011); Sharon Finkel, Note, Voice of Justice: Promoting Fairness Through Appointed
Counsel for Immigrant Children, 17 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1105, 1107
(2001); Benjamin Good, Note, A Child's Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings,
10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 109, 111 (2014).
189. See, e.g., Sabrineh Ardalan, Access to Justice for Asylum Seekers: Developing
an Effective Model of Holistic Asylum Representation, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1001,
1038 (2015); John R. Mills et al., “Death is Different" and a Refugee's Right to Counsel,
42 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 361, 363 (2009); Kaitlin M. Talley, Comment, Dignity and Due
Process for Asylum Seekers: Why Achieving Universal Representation for Asylum
Seekers is Essential to Due Process, 52 U.S.F. L. REV. 299, 300 (2018).
190. Wilson & Prokop, supra note 163, at 3.
191. See, e.g., PETER L. MARKOWITZ, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT & N.Y. STATE
DEFS. ASS’N, PROTOCOL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER IMMIGRATION
SERVICE PLAN 1, 6 (2009); Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel
in Padilla v. Kentucky: Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1468 (2011); Andrés Dae Keun Kwon, Comment, Defending
Criminal(ized) “Aliens” After Padilla: Toward a More Holistic Public Immigration
Defense in the Era of Crimmigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1034, 1038 (2016).
192. Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents,
122 YALE L.J. 2394, 2397 (2013).
193. Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in
Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 116 (2008).
194. Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18
MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 68 (2012).
195. See, e.g., Mark Noferi, Making Civil Immigration Detention “Civil,” and
Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil Detention Paradigm, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV.
533, 540 (2014); Carla L. Reyes, Access to Counsel in Removal Proceedings: A Case
Study for Exploring the Legal and Societal Imperative to Expand the Civil Right to
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the due process arguments forwarded by scholars have worked to
analogize the right to counsel for certain defendants in criminal
proceedings as described in the seminal case Gideon v. Wainwright.196
In doing so, scholars primarily rely on the Fifth Amendment197 and
Sixth Amendment,198 working within the frameworks laid out in
Mathews v. Eldridge199 and Turner v. Rogers.200 These arguments
have been met with limited success, most notably in FrancoGonzalez.201 Some scholars have noted that seeking a “discovered”
right to government appointed counsel in immigration proceedings
through litigation is unlikely to be successful.202 Still others have
Counsel, 17 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 131, 132 (2014); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, The
Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel and the Discounted Danger of Private
Power, 42 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 889, 936 (2015); Renata Robertson, Note, The Right
to Court-Appointed Counsel in Removal Proceedings: An End to Wrongful Detention
and Deportation of U.S. Citizens, 15 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC.
JUST. 567, 601 (2013).
196. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see, e.g., Lucas Guttentag &
Ahilan Arulanantham, Extending the Promise of Gideon: Immigration, Deportation,
and the Right to Counsel, HUM. RTS., Apr. 2013, at 14, 14.
197. See, e.g., Johan Fatemi, A Constitutional Case for Appointed Counsel in
Immigration Proceedings: Revisiting Franco-Gonzalez, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 915, 923,
963 (2016); Soulmaz Taghavi, Montes-Lopez v. Holder: Applying Eldridge to Ensure a
Per Se Right to Counsel for Indigent Immigrants in Removal Proceedings, 39 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 245, 269 (2014).
198. See, e.g., Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 585, 588–89 (2011); Note, A Prison is a Prison is a Prison: Mandatory
Immigration Detention and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 129 HARV. L. REV.
522, 524 (2015).
199. 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
200. 564 U.S. 431, 444–45 (2011); see, e.g., Shane T. Devins, Comment, Using the
Language of Turner v. Rogers to Advocate For a Right to Counsel in Immigration
Removal Proceedings, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 893, 895 (2013).
201. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(requiring government-appointed counsel for certain immigrant detainees in certain
facilities with mental disabilities who are found to be “incompetent” or unable to
adequately represent themselves in immigration proceedings). But see Matter of M-AM-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 478, 481–82 (B.I.A 2011) (declining to find that the provision
of counsel to incompetent respondents was always the appropriate remedy and
determined that other provisions or “safeguards” may be appropriate to ensure that
the proceeding is “fair”).
202. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2292–93,
2303, 2305 (2013) (although finding little progress in right-to-counsel jurisprudence,
noting positive developments in legislative action); Careen Shannon, Immigration is
Different: Why Congress Should Guarantee Access to Counsel in All Immigration
Matters, 17 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 165, 167 (2014); Kara A. Naseef, Note, How to
Decrease the Immigration Backlog: Expand Representation and End Unnecessary
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argued that this rights-based rhetoric could actually lead to more
harm than good.203 In contrast, this Article does not seek to expand
upon or respond to this rights-based discourse, but rather to propose
an alternative approach through policymaking. Importantly, many of
the statistics and underlying arguments about fairness in proceedings
support this Article’s proposed solution: universal representation. The
difference in approach is simply the method by which the outcome is
achieved. Whereas the aforementioned scholars have made
compelling arguments for a constitutional right to appointed counsel
in immigration proceedings, this Article seeks to show how a policy
change is possible and will ultimately yield the same fruit.
Generally, immigrants in removal proceedings are statutorily
permitted to have access to counsel, but “at no expense to the
Government.”204 While this language has been used to defeat efforts
to gain universal representation under due process arguments, the
possibility of using government funding for such a project has not been
completely foreclosed.205 In 1995, INS general counsel issued an
opinion finding that the above provision precludes a “right to
representation at government expense,” but that it does not
necessarily
“prohibit
federal
expenditures
to
‘facilitate’
representation.”206 This interpretation has led to the implementation
of legal orientation programs throughout detention centers in the
United States.207 In 2010, the principal deputy general counsel of DHS
issued a legal opinion finding that there is “no general statutory
prohibition” preventing the use of discretionary funding for legal
representation in removal proceedings, “so long as Congress
authorized it for this purpose.”208 This demonstrates how the
legislature could lawfully act to implement a universal representation
system. In fact, the Department of Justice has already created a pilot
Detention, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 771, 773 (2019); see also Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous
Advocacy: Pushing Against the Borders in Immigration Litigation, 45 SETON HALL L.
REV. 475, 526 (2015) (arguing that “appointed counsel is increasingly a legislative
matter”); Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens:
Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1675 (1997) (“[T]he
persistent problems that make it all but impossible for most detainees to secure legal
representation have not been—and probably cannot be—effectively resolved by
judicial decree.”).
203. See Allegra M. McLeod, Immigration, Criminalization, and Disobedience, 70
U. MIA. L. REV. 556, 559 (2016).
204. KERWIN, supra note 160, at 2.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 3.
208. Id. at 2.
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of sorts with its representation program for a select portion of the
detained population, known as the National Qualified Representative
Program (NQRP).209 Here, there is an available avenue for
implementation of a large-scale universal representation program,
and the federal government is well-equipped and legally permitted to
allocate funds accordingly.
3. Law and Society / Critical Theory Critiques
Last is the question of whether a universal representation
proposal can survive the many critiques that exist decrying the unmet
promises of Gideon.210 Here, two scholars, Stephen Bright and Paul
Butler, have scrutinized the public defender system’s panacea
approach, finding that it could well be doing more harm than good.211
They find that this approach has resulted in a justification for the
criminal justice system and all its faults, and the creation of such a
large-scale structure promotes complicity with a system that
continues to target and marginalize vulnerable individuals.212 This is
the most salient critique to consider in whether to embark on this
entire enterprise of universal representation in the immigration
context. However, there are some important distinctions between the
structure of Gideon-style appointed representation and the policy
proposed by this Article. First, the proposed universal representation
program would not rely on appointed counsel. Instead, it would
involve partnering with local non-profits who have dedicated and
experienced lawyers with a desire to do this specific type of work.
Second, it would also be fully funded by the federal government
through its diversion of funds typically reserved for immigration
detention to those non-profit legal service organizations. Last,
because the proposed solution is policy-oriented, it would not be
subject to the same rights-based critiques that have been directed at
the limitations of the Gideon implementation.213

209. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 164 (“NQRP [is] a nationwide program
to provide Qualified Representatives (QRs) to certain unrepresented and detained
respondents who are found by an Immigration Judge or the BIA to be mentally
incompetent to represent themselves in immigration proceedings.”).
210. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837–41 (1994); Paul D.
Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2176
(2013); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
211. See generally Bright, supra note 210; Butler, supra note 210.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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a. Quality of counsel concerns
One critique is that of Stephen Bright, who provided a compilation
of bad, unethical, and ultimately harmful lawyering in his important
essay, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer.214 In his essay, Bright brings light to
the underlying warning of Anthony Lewis, who, writing in response
to the Gideon decision, says,
It will be an enormous task to bring to life the dream
of Gideon v. Wainwright—the dream of a vast, diverse
country in which every person charged with a crime
will be capably defended, no matter what his economic
circumstances, and in which the lawyer representing
him will do so proudly, without resentment at an
unfair burden, sure of the support needed to make an
adequate defense.215
The prospect of creating a nation-wide universal representation
program is equally grand in scope and ambition. While such warnings
should be duly heeded, they should not serve to create an impasse in
the path toward creating such a program. Bright continues in his
essay to provide examples of individuals with limited intellectual
capacity and undiagnosed and/or unmedicated mental illness, who
were executed despite this information not being presented to the
court by defense counsel.216 Bright points to a number of concerns in
many public defender systems: the poor pay, the varied appointment
processes, the fact that many of these attorneys had poor or no
training, and that they frequently held biases against their own
clients.217 Bright’s conclusion is that the majority of the death row
population are distinguished “by neither their records nor the
circumstances of their crimes, but by their abject poverty, debilitating
mental impairments . . . and the poor legal representation they
received.”218 Bright cites these results as the failure to keep the
promise of Gideon, relying on an report by the American Bar
Association which stated that “long-term neglect and underfunding of

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Bright, supra note 210, at 1837–41.
Id. at 1836 (quoting ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 205 (1964)).
Id. at 1837.
Id. at 1838–39, 1842–43.
Id. at 1840.
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indigent defense has created a crisis of extraordinary proportions in
many states throughout the country.”219
Bright’s article serves as an apt cautionary tale and provides
helpful direction for how to avoid these issues in the establishment of
a nation-wide universal representation program.220 First, counsel will
not be appointed at random, but rather through a uniform process
supervised and overseen by local non-profits and public defender
offices.221 This structure provides an opportunity for quality control,
training, and professional development. Second, pay and resources
are a large concern raised by Bright.222 However, in the pilot projects
that have been initiated, the average costs of cases have already been
accounted for in the funding proposals regularly submitted and
approved by the non-profit organizations and public defender offices
who have piloted these projects.223 Last, because of the nature of these
offices and their work, they recruit and identify new attorneys who
will be dedicated to this work in a way that cannot necessarily be
expected of the bar at large.224
4. The Critique of Rights
Another important critique of a universal representation project
is presented in Paul Butler’s article, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the
Critique of Rights.225 Butler exposes an important fact followed by an
equally stunning premise in his abstract:
A low income person is more likely to be prosecuted
and imprisoned post-Gideon than pre-Gideon. Poor
people lose in American criminal justice not because
they have ineffective lawyers but because they are
selectively targeted by police, prosecutors, and law
makers. The critique of rights suggests that rights are
indeterminate and regressive. Gideon demonstrates
219. Id. at 1866 (quoting RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, THE
INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 25 (1993) (prepared for the American Bar Association
Section of Criminal Justice Ad Hoc Committee on the Indigent Defense Crisis)).
220. See generally Bright, supra note 210 for his more detailed cautionary tale.
221. Bright, supra note 210, at 1870.
222. Id. at 1851.
223. See, e.g., COLO. FISCAL INST., A MATTER OF JUSTICE: COST SAVINGS FROM
UNIVERSAL LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ALL COLORADO IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
(2021),
https://www.coloradofiscal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/2.12.21-FinalReport-2.pdf.
224. Bright, supra note 210, at 1851.
225. Butler, supra note 210.
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this critique: it has not improved the situation of most
poor people, and in some ways has worked their plight.
Gideon provides a degree of legitimacy for the status
quo.226
As Butler states, “It would be preferable to be a poor black charged
with a crime in 1962 than now, if one’s objective is to avoid prison or
serve as little time as possible.”227 He bases this declaration on
objective evidence,228 which he states demonstrates the critique of
rights.229 He defines the critique of rights as positing that, “‘nothing
whatever follows from a court’s adoption of some legal rule’ and that
‘winning a legal victory can actually impede further progressive
change.’”230 These are important criticisms that Butler levels at
Gideon and its resulting inadequacies. However, this Article
distinguishes its proposal in that it does not ground its support for
universal representation in the due process arguments under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments that many scholars have advocated.231
Instead, this Article advocates for a policy change, one which is
grounded in abolition theory. By eliminating immigration detention
and reallocating that funding to a representation project, this
proposal would effectively eliminate an oppressive system while
building up a supportive one in its place.
Butler rightfully explains that African Americans are more
policed, subject to “social conditions that breed some forms of lawbreaking,” and are disproportionately poor and/or subject to “explicit
and implicit bias by key actors[.]”232 These same concerns are present
for immigrants who are policed for their skin color, language or
accent, and presence in specific communities.233 While the Obama
administration had provided a format for evaluating whether a person
226. Id. at 2176.
227. Id. at 2178.
228. Id. at 2180 (“In 1960, three years before Gideon, the black incarceration rate
was approximately 660 per 100,000. By 1970, it had fallen some, to slightly under 600
per 100,000. In 2010, the rate of incarceration among black males was an astronomical
3,074 per 100,000.” (footnotes omitted)).
229. See id.
230. Id. at 2178 (quoting Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV.
23, 26, 32 (1993)).
231. See id. at 2197 (“Procedural fairness not only produces faith in the outcome
of individual trials; it reinforces faith in the legal system as a whole.”) (quoting Michael
O’Donnell, Crime and Punishment: On William Stuntz, NATION, (Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.thenation.com/article/165569/crime-and-punishment-william-stuntz.).
232. Id. at 2183 (citations omitted).
233. See generally MOLINA, supra note 57 for a discussion on how racial biases
impact immigration and immigrants.
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might be arrested by ICE, the Trump administration resorted to a
policy of non-priority, meaning that all individuals without
immigration status (or in danger of losing their status) can rightfully
be fearful of being detained by ICE. In fact, despite Trump’s rhetoric
conflating migration with crime, current data shows that the vast
majority of detained immigrants have no criminal conviction on
record.234
While creating a universal representation system does rely
heavily on the ideal of fairness, and thus risks further validating the
system that it already well-entrenched, it serves two important goals.
First, it would be a practical and achievable first step toward
eliminating immigration detention, appealing to more than the
ideologically committed few, because of its reliance on an economic
argument. Second, it may help to initiate a severance between the
notions of immigration and criminality that currently permeate the
larger societal psyche in the United States by eliminating the specter
of immigration detention.
Butler’s critique is well-heeded. Engaging with the system lends
credence to the system and further justifies its existence. It may be
that the creation of this system does make the abolition of the removal
process less likely. Be that as it may, this proposal is a practical one
that requires little imagination on behalf of the targeted cohort. In
fact, that may be the reason why it could result in a more immediate
implementation. It reaches across the spectrum of ideologies in a
coherent way. There is certainly tension here, but the tension can be
resolved by the fact that this proposal furthers the goal of abolition –
if implemented, the ultimate result would remain the complete
dismantling of the immigration detention system. Moreover, it would
satisfy the abolitionist goal of removing funding from the hands of a
government agency and instead distributing it among local non-profit
agencies and public defender offices, who can more aptly address the
needs of their local communities. This redistribution would lead to the
elimination of immigration detention and supplant it with a universal
representation program that would be more economical while still
satisfying the ultimate goal of promoting client appearance. The
ultimate goal of abolition is to eliminate a harmful system and to build
up something supportive in its place. This Article shows how an
unorthodox approach may be able to build more support for such a
vision while still doing its best to adhere to the abolitionist ethic of
234. See Growth in ICE Detention Fueled by Immigrants with No Criminal
Conviction, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Nov. 26, 2019),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/583/ (finding that 64% of detainees had no
criminal conviction on record, up from just under 40% nationwide four years earlier).
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tearing down something destructive and rebuilding something
positive in its place.
In fact, Butler concludes his critique by first advocating for the
necessity of “people . . . still becom[ing] criminal defense attorneys[,]”
because “effective defense counsel can . . . make[] an enormous
difference in the lives of incarcerated people and their families.” 235
While Butler does not advocate for a particular approach, he calls
upon scholars and organizers to abandon a legal rights-based
approach in favor of other methods for creating social change.236 Many
current grassroots organizations and others argue for the abolition of
ICE and the entire enforcement system.237 This Article’s proposal to
pursue a policy of universal representation could fit within this vision
for alternative social change. The hope is that this Article illuminates
a path forward that is already broadly supported, has found its origins
in grassroots efforts, and is driven by data that shows its
effectiveness.
IV. ABOLITION IS STILL THE SOLUTION
The movement for the abolition of immigration detention is
grounded in similar principles to those that have created support for
the criminal decarceration movement. First, abolition argues that the
detention of migrants is inhumane, immoral, and inadequate in its
purpose.238 Second, the abolition movement emphasizes the
importance of building up another structure, one that is humane,
moral and more adequately suited to its purpose, to replace that of the
current detention system.239 Such a vision is not one of utopia; it is
eminently possible.240
Prison abolition does not mean opening every
prison. . . . [It does not mean] let[ting] everybody go
home tomorrow. [I]t . . . [is] a process of gradual
235. Butler, supra note 210, at 2202.
236. Id. at 2202–04.
237. See Markowitz, supra note 9, at 131.
238. In fact, the creation of immigration detention and expulsion in the 19th
century meant that, “For the first time since slavery, an entire category of people in
the United States could be imprisoned without a trial by jury.” Hernández, supra note
54, at 57.
239. See Patrisse Cullors, Abolition and Reparations: Histories of Resistance,
Transformative Justice, and Accountability, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1687 (2019).
240. See Paul Butler, Professor, Geo. L. Ctr., Jefferson Lecture at University of
California Berkeley: How Prison Abolition Would Make Us All Safer (Jan.17, 2020),
https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/01/17/berkeley-talks-paul-butler/.
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decarceration with the goal of finding how close we can
get to completely eliminating incarceration while
finding alternative means of accomplishing any of the
possible benefits of prison.241
This excerpt from Paul Butler’s speech at U.C. Berkeley in January
2020 highlights the same point he iterated when speaking later that
year at my own institution.242 He made it clear that abolition is a
movement not of erasure, but of replacement—a new system replacing
the old.243 His theory rests on three fundamental points:
One is that we need abolition to solve the problem of
mass incarceration. Reform is not going to work.
Second, there are alternatives to incarceration that can
provide any of the crime control benefits we think
prison does now. Third, to be truly transformative,
abolition has to be more than just tearing down the
prison walls. We have to build something up, too.244
Abolition has a long history, but its purpose has always been the
same: the elimination of a policy which dehumanizes and harms
fellow human beings.245 The current abolition movement imagines “an
array of alternative nonpenal regulatory frameworks and an ethic
that recognizes the violence, dehumanization, and moral wrong
inherent in any act of caging or chaining—or otherwise confining and
controlling by penal force—human beings.”246 Angela Davis spoke of
the harm of confining people and excluding them to a different reality.
She explains that “[w]e become numb to the inhumanness of prison
and we dissociate ourselves from the people in prison.”247 Noting how
prisons target minority groups, Davis acknowledges that abolitionists
241. Id.
242. Peter Jetton, Paul Butler to Deliver Inaugural Smith Lecture at W&L Law,
WM. & MARY: COLUMNS (Feb. 5, 2020), https://columns.wlu.edu/paul-butler-to-deliverinaugural-smith-lecture-at-wl-law/.
243. Butler, supra note 240.
244. Id.
245. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 9–10 (Open Media ed., 2003).
The prison industrial complex “is a set of symbiotic relationships among correctional
communities, transnational corporations, media conglomerates, guards' unions, and
legislative and court agendas.” Id. at 107. The abolitionist approach is to not look “for
prisonlike substitutes for the prison, such as house arrest safeguarded by electronic
surveillance bracelets.” Id.
246. McLeod, supra note 3, at 1172.
247. DAVIS, supra note 245, at 25.
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should defend immigrants’ rights as a next step in the abolition
process.248 She calls for the decriminalization of undocumented
immigrants in the fight for prison abolition.249 This theory of abolition
is easily extended to the question of immigration detention.250 As Prof.
García Hernández says, “[t]o be sure, this proposal represents a
radical transformation, but it is not without precedent. The public’s
shift away from slavery was no less radical.”251 Compared to the
institution of criminal jails and prisons, immigration detention is
relatively new.252 However, the call for its abolition can resound loudly
because it builds on the injustices raised by other abolition
movements, most recently through the decarceration movement.253 In
essence, “the logical conclusion of this narrative is that, as a modern
addition to the United States’ long history of radicalized policy
making, immigration imprisonment is indefensible and, as such,
should be abolished.”254
While the idea of working within the system may seem
contradictory to some of the underlying tenets of abolition, there is a
way to reconcile the disparate notions. Providing universal
representation can be a way to support the abolitionist framework
even if the policy proposal is in itself not strictly abolitionist. Here,
there is an interest convergence that has already resulted in beneficial
policies reducing the overall number of individuals incarcerated for
criminal purposes.255 This Article proposes to use that successful
campaign for a similar purpose: the elimination of immigration
detention. The ultimate effect, therefore, is one of abolition. The
proposal is merely a practical approach for how to go about massively
reducing or eliminating the number of individuals held in
immigration detention. If abolition is to succeed, then the coalition
needs to grow larger. One way to incorporate unlikely supporters into
this effort is by making good use of the economic argument: namely,
that there are more efficient ways to ensure appearance at
immigration proceedings than detention.

248. See id. at 110.
249. Id.
250. See Hernández, supra note 54, at 66.
251. García Hernández, supra note 2, at 299.
252. See SMITH, supra note 81, at 2–5 for an overview of the legal and historical
background of immigration detention.
253. See discussion infra Section V.D.1.
254. García Hernández, supra note 2, at 300.
255. See discussion infra Part V.
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V. UNIVERSAL REPRESENTATION AS A PRACTICAL FIRST STEP TOWARD
ABOLITION
As mentioned above, abolition requires that something be built up
in place of the system which is being dismantled.256 Here, advocacy
for the abolition of immigration detention is accompanied by a
solution to replace it. This part of the Article proposes that universal
representation is an equally effective and more cost-efficient way to
ensure the appearance of individuals at their immigration
hearings.257 Before delving into an explanation of how a universal
representation program could supplant immigration detention, this
section addresses other proposals and pilot programs that have been
met with varying levels of success. Many of the proposals are not
absolute—they permit discretion in determining whether someone
should remain in detention or monitored by some other means. Here,
the proposal is for wholesale elimination of the immigration detention
system in favor of universal representation. Providing an attorney to
individuals, and perhaps coupling this representation with other lowcost wrap-around services,258 will result in the desired outcome—
attendance at future immigration hearings. Importantly, it will do so
at a lower cost and in a way that promotes that humanity of
individuals seeking relief and their families.
A. Carceral Alternatives to Detention
The primary way to avoid immigration detention after arrest by
ICE is to demonstrate that one is neither a flight risk nor a danger to
256. See discussion supra Part IV.
257. Again, despite assertions to the contrary, the data is very clear that the
majority of individuals show up for their immigration proceedings. See Salvador Rizzo,
How Many Migrants Show up for Immigration Court Hearings?, WASH. POST (June
26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/26/how-many-migrantsshow-up-immigration-court-hearings/; see also VERA INST. OF JUST., FACT SHEET:
EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT MOST IMMIGRANTS APPEAR FOR IMMIGRATION COURT
HEARINGS (2020), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/immigrant-courtappearance-fact-sheet.pdf.
258. In other countries, community-based case management programs have
proven to be effective alternatives to immigration detention. Australia, Sweden, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Indonesia have all successfully
implemented such programs. Compliance rates are ninety-four percent in Australia,
ninety-seven percent in Hong Kong, ninety-seven percent in Thailand, which has a
program that focuses specifically on unaccompanied children seeking refugee status,
and ninety-four percent for a similar program in Indonesia. These examples show that
case management is an effective tool to help people navigate complex immigration
proceedings. Marouf, supra note 4, at 2169–70.
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the community and then pay a bond to ICE.259 But, there are many
alternatives to immigration detention and bond determinations by
ICE or an immigration judge.260 These alternatives include ankle
monitoring,261 algorithms for determining whether a person should be
released,262 house arrest, check-ins either by phone or in-person, and
a number of other solutions that are cumbersome, costly, and
invasive.263 These alternatives are typically a way of monitoring a
person without technical confinement; however, they are still
harmful.264 This Article declines to consider those alternatives, as
259. Bonds are supposed to ensure that individuals attend and complete their
immigration hearings. However, the difficult recovery process of these payments has
resulted in nearly $204 million held by ICE in bond money, with more than 18,000
bond payments left unclaimed. See Meagan Flynn, ICE is Holding $204 Million in
Bond Money, and Some Immigrants Might Never Get It Back, WASH. POST (Apr. 26,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/ice-is-holding-204-million-inbond-money-and-some-immigrants-might-never-get-it-back/2019/04/26/dcaa69a05709-11e9-9136-f8e636f1f6df_story.html.
260. A range of alternatives to detention already exists, yet detention remains the
default, rather than being used as a last resort. Furthermore, the most coercive
alternative-to-detention program, which involves electronic monitoring, is used far
more often than less restrictive alternatives. Meanwhile, community-based
alternatives involving case management, which have proven highly successful in other
countries, are just getting off the ground in the United States. Marouf, supra note 4,
at 2143.
261. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 78, at 1515 (explaining that many new
alternatives to detention (ATDs) in the modern world were technologically impossible
in the past, including ankle monitors and other electronic devices).
262. See, e.g., Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and
Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 162–63 (2013) (proposing a
“risk assessment tool”).
263. “[M]any advocates and commentators have made persuasive legal
arguments, supported by federal court precedents, that ‘custody’ should be more
broadly interpreted to include other forms of restrictions on liberty, such as house
arrest and electronic monitoring.” Marouf, supra note 4, at 2147 (citing Philip L.
Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics, Profit, and
the Meaning of “Custody”, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879, 906–11 (2015)); see also CARL
TAKEI ET AL., AM. C.L. UNION, SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS: WHY AND HOW THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SHOULD STOP USING PRIVATE PRISONS 6
(2016).
264. See, e.g., MARK NOFERI, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A HUMANE APPROACH CAN
WORK: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVE TO DETENTION FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS 9–
10 (2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
a_humane_approach_can_work_the_effectiveness_of_alternatives_to_detention_for_a
sylum_seekers.pdf.). But see RUTGERS SCH. OF LAW-NEWARK IMMIGRANT RTS. CLINIC
& AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., FREED BUT NOT FREE: A REPORT EXAMINING THE
CURRENT USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION DETENTION 2 (2012),
https://www.afsc.org/sites/default/files/documents/Freed-but-not-Free.pdf (critiquing
the “alternative detention” approach).

2021]

PRACTICAL ABOLITION

247

many scholars have already done so. Instead, this Article seeks to
investigate an alternative that promotes compliance in a non-carceral
and non-punitive way.265
B. Non-Carceral Alternatives to Detention
There has already been remarkable success with a variety of noncarceral and non-punitive alternatives.266 The history of these
successes dates back to the Reagan era, when INS worked with the
United States Catholic Conference to provide “education, job training,
substance abuse treatment, and weekly meetings to” a large group of
Mariel Cubans from 1987 to 1999, during which 75% of the
participants complied with the program requirements.267 Following
this success, in 1997, INS partnered with the Vera Institute of Justice
to develop a compliance-support pilot program which sent migrants to
live with community sponsors instead of confining them to detention
centers.268 There, they were oriented and provided with information
about how to seek legal counsel.269 This program, initiated during the
Clinton era, saw an 85% compliance rate.270 Last, a study of an
Obama-era program run by Lutheran Immigration and Refugee
Services demonstrates similar success.271 While only a small sample
of ten migrant families, these individuals were provided with help to
find housing, were educated about the legal process, and importantly,
provided legal counsel.272 This program had a 100% compliance

265. See, e.g., René Lima-Marín & Danielle C. Jefferis, It’s Just Like Prison: Is a
Civil (Nonpunitive) System of Immigration Detention Theoretically Possible?, 96 DENV.
L. REV. 955 (2019) (discussing proposals for a system of civil supervision).
266. See generally DAVID SECOR ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., A BETTER
WAY: COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAMMING AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO IMMIGRANT
INCARCERATION (2019), https://immigrantjustice.org/research-items/report-betterway-community-based-programming-alternative-immigrant-incarceration.
267. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 10, at 151. It should be noted that Prof.
García Hernández references the fact that these were known to be some of INS’s “most
notorious detainees” and alludes to Scarface as a helpful illustration of the typical
participant. See also DONALD KERWIN, ET AL., CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC.,
THE NEEDLESS DETENTION OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 27–28 (2000).
268. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 10, at 151–52.
269. Id. at 152.
270. Id.; see also MEGAN GOLDEN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., THE APPEARANCE
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: ATTAINING COMPLIANCE WITH IMMIGRATION LAWS THROUGH
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 6–7 (1998).
271. See GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 10, at 152.
272. Id.
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rate.273 As Alina Das explains, the partnership with Vera in the 1990s
provided “an alternative to traditional detention that ensured
community supervision and appearance of noncitizens for the removal
process at significantly lower costs.”274
However, “Congress
implemented mandatory detention before giving the agency an
opportunity to implement these alternative methods on a larger
scale.”275 Yet, these programs demonstrate that “it is possible to
comply with immigration requirements and enjoy the freedom most of
us take for granted.”276
One key artifact of a successful program is its approach to legal
orientation. Several programs currently provide legal orientation in
detention centers.277 However, while legal orientation programs are
helpful, the likelihood of success is highly dependent on whether an
individual is represented by counsel or not.278 The immigration
system is complex, rapid, and of great import. A common refrain is
that our current system requires immigration judges to conduct the
equivalent of “death penalty cases in a traffic court setting.”279 This
experience can be intimidating, frustrating, and result in tragic
outcomes.280 Moreover, a lack of understanding could ultimately
result in failure, or reluctance, to appear for their scheduled hearings.
However, the presence of skilled counsel can have a significant effect
on the likelihood of success in a given case. Instead of being viewed
separately
from
immigration
detention,
providing
legal
273. Id.; see also LUTHERAN IMMIGR. & REFUGEE SERV., FAMILY PLACEMENT
ALTERNATIVES: PROMOTING COMPLIANCE WITH COMPASSION AND STABILITY THROUGH
CASE MANAGEMENT SERVICES 8 (2016), http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/04/LIRS_FamilyPlacementAlternativesFinalReport.pdf.; KATHARINA OBSER,
WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, THE FAMILY CASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM: WHY CASE
MANAGEMENT CAN AND MUST BE PART OF THE US APPROACH TO IMMIGRATION 8–10
(2019), https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/TheFamily-Case-Management-Program.pdf; Ruthie Epstein, The Tried-And-True
Alternatives to Detaining Immigrant Families, AM. C.L. UNION BLOG (June 22, 2018,
4:30PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-anddetention/tried-and-true-alternatives-detaining.
274. Das, supra note 262, at 153–54.
275. Id. at 154.
276. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 10, at 153.
277. KERWIN, supra note 160, at 2.
278. See discussion infra Section V.C.
279. Hon. Mark A. Drummond, “Death Penalty Cases in a Traffic Court Setting.”
Lessons from the Front Lines of Today’s Immigration Courts, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 15,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/
practice-points/death-penalty-cases-traffic-court-setting-lessons-front-linesimmigration-courts/.
280. See Outcalt, supra note 53 (discussing how current immigration policies
affect family stability and mental health).
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representation to immigrants should be supported as an alternative
to detention.
C. Providing Immigrants with Counsel Increases the Already High
Levels of Compliance
Broadly speaking, this Article is premised on the idea that
immigration detention should be eliminated. If the singular purpose
of immigration detention is to ensure attendance at future
immigration hearings, this Article proposes that there are a
significant number of alternatives that are equally effective, while
being more just, humane, and cost-effective than large-scale detention
of migrants.
First, immigration detention is per se unnecessary because
individuals released from detention simply show up to their hearings.
While the Trump Administration claimed that the vast majority of
immigrants in removal proceedings never show up to their
hearings,281 that simply isn’t true. In 2019, 99% of asylum seekers
appeared at all of their hearings.282 This alone should be sufficient
data to demonstrate that immigration detention is unnecessary.
However, not all will feel comfortable with the idea of permitting a
large number of individuals to be released from detention on their own
recognizance with little more than a promise to appear, regardless of
what the data bear out. In order to help assuage those concerns, this
Article proposes an economically efficient way to ensure appearance—
providing universal representation to those individuals who would
have otherwise been detained and building wrap-around support
systems that promote hearing attendance at a fraction of the cost of
detention.
Providing individuals with an attorney correlates strongly with
that individual’s likelihood to appear at future hearings. The seminal
study on this issue found that “68% of pro se nondetained respondents
were removed in absentia, compared to only 7% of nondetained cases
with legal representation.”283 The importance of counsel is proved by
the full study, which concluded that, over a six-year period, “only 32%
281. Full Transcript of “Face the Nation” on June 23, 2019, CBS NEWS (June 23,
2019, 2:12 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/full-transcript-of-face-the-nation-onjune-23-2019/ (quoting then-Vice President Pence: “[T]he vast majority [of asylum
seekers] never show up for their hearings.”).
282. Nicole Narea, Trump Says Most Asylum Seekers Don’t Show Up for Their
Court Hearings. A New Study Says 99% do., VOX (Jan. 10, 2020, 4:50 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/1/10/21059924/trump-asylum-seekers-show-up-courthearing.
283. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 152, at 73.
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of nondetained pro se respondents showed up to court, compared to
93% of nondetained respondents with counsel.”284 The Department of
Justice’s own data show that “89 percent of all asylum applicants
attended their final court hearing to receive a decision on their
application.”285 This trend has been even stronger in earlier years,
where, again, according to the DOJ’s own statistics, “92 percent of
asylum seekers appeared in court to receive a final decision on their
claims” between 2013 and 2017.286 Importantly, when represented by
counsel, the number skyrockets. In 2018, the rate of compliance for
families and unaccompanied children who were represented by
attorneys was 98%.287 Asylum seekers who had been released from
immigration detention had a 98.5% compliance rate, whether
represented by counsel or not.288 In fact, the overall rate of missed
hearings has dropped nearly 25% since 2012.289 In 2018, 89.4% of
individuals who applied for asylum attended all hearings, and overall,
approximately 75% of individuals attend their hearings as
required.290 This number has held steady from 2013–2018, despite a
variety of policy changes during that time.291
These statistics show: (1) that immigrants are more likely than
not to show up to their proceedings, and (2) that the likelihood of
attending immigration hearings increases when one has counsel. This
correlation demonstrates the importance of having counsel in a
complex immigration system. Because of the labyrinthine nature of
immigration proceedings, having experienced counsel is necessary if
to act as nothing more than a guide. Moreover, having counsel may
result in people simply feeling like they are getting a fair shake in
immigration proceedings.

284. Id.
285. HUM. RTS. FIRST, Fact Check: Asylum Seekers Regularly Attend Immigration
Court Hearings (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/factcheck-asylum-seekers-regularly-attend-immigration-court-hearings.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. Cf. President Donald Trump, Address at the 100th Annual Farm Bureau
Convention (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?456954-1/president-trumpaddresses-farm-bureau-convention.
289. HUM. RTS. FIRST, supra note 285.
290. Id.
291. Narea, supra note 282 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Statistics Yearbook Fiscal
Year 2018, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download).
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D. Fiscal Argument and Convergence Theory
The central thesis of this Article is that a successful abolition
movement will need to broaden to incorporate the support of
individuals who might not typically align with a “progressive
movement” or might find it objectionable to support a policy that they
believe opposes “law and order.” The argument in this Article relies
strongly on Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence theory. Bell’s theory
provides a critique of Brown v. Board of Education, finding that there
were ancillary interests beyond “equality” that drove this decision,
including foreign, domestic, and economic policy concerns.292
Essentially, Bell claimed that, “The interests of [B]lacks in achieving
racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the
interests of whites.”293 This theory has been borne out with the advent
and rise of the decarceration movement that has been embraced by a
broad spectrum of both politically and fiscally conservative
advocates.294 The success of this movement, culminating in the recent
First Step Act signed into law by the Trump administration, should
be examined in determining how it might be possible to demonstrate
that the interests of those who are traditionally opposed to rights for
migrants might actually align with many of the underpinnings of the
immigration detention abolition movement.
1. Convergence Theory in the Decarceration Movement
As Bell rightly explained, white people, as the collective
beneficiaries of a society built upon structural racism, will be resistant
to yielding such power unless they believe there is some individual or
collective good that could derive from that power.295 Here, whiteness
creates a presumption of belonging, both as part of the citizenry, but
also as part of the decision-making apparatus that wields power.
Traditionally, such power is most effectively wielded under the
auspice of fiscal responsibility. The success of this argument can be
seen in the rise in support of the decarceration movement from many
who would traditionally oppose the mass release of individuals from
292. Bell, supra, note 11 at 524. This theory was grounded in the idea that there
was no miraculous conversion of the public; indeed, there was limited public support
for desegregation. The Court cast itself as one of magnanimity, refusing to perpetuate
the continued segregation of children in schools based on race. However, Bell points
out that there were other concerns at the time. Id. at 523–25.
293. Id. at 523
294. See Getting out of Prison Sooner, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Jul. 17, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/892465005.
295. See Bell, surpa note 230, at 524.
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prisons and jails. If it is politically acceptable for a conservative
individual to be supportive of the decarceration movement, then
logically, it would seem possible to shift the collective conservative
perspective to support the abolition, or at least reduction, of
immigration detention.
One specific example of unlikely support for the decarceration
movement is visible in Oklahoma, where Kris Steele, a Republican in
the Oklahoma House of Representatives describes his own personal
reckoning on this issue.296 He notes how it used to be that there was
“[p]olitical value . . . in being [seen as], quote-unquote, ‘tough on
crime,’ and we gave very little thought to the actual cost.”297 He
describes how, when he was appointed to the committee governing the
state’s budget, he realized that “corrections had become Oklahoma’s
second-fastest growing expenditure.”298 The shift occurred when he
analyzed that all of this incarceration was not having a measurable
effect on criminality.299 Steele goes on to say, “[i]t would be one thing
if mass incarceration actually worked in reducing crime or improving
public safety. It does not. In fact, not only does Oklahoma have higher
incarceration rates, our crime rate is not decreasing nearly as rapidly
as in other states.”300
When considering the alternatives to immigration detention, a
fiscally conservative individual may be convinced that there is a
benefit to limiting immigration detention because it could lower the
expenses of the US government. This argument would appeal both to
the average neutral taxpayer and to any political representative who
purports to be influenced by the importance of balancing the budget.
Such an appeal is especially timely given that the U.S. deficit has now
exceeded its annual GDP.301 A rudimentary analysis can be made by
aggregating the current overall costs of immigration enforcement and
detention, and then looking to how these financial burdens might be
alleviated. Several states and localities have already undertaken and
completed studies specific to their respective geographic regions. 302
These studies outline the various realms that should be considered in
296. See NAT’L PUB. RADIO, supra note 294.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Kate Davidson, U.S. Debt Is Set to Exceed Size of the Economy Next Year, a
First Since World War II, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2020, 5:18PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-debt-is-set-to-exceed-size-of-the-economy-for-year-afirst-since-world-war-ii-11599051137.
302. See generally VERA INST. OF JUST., supra note 149 (highlighting the many
states that have a publicly funded deportation defense program).
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this analysis when making an economic argument.303 They include:
(1) the cost of detaining someone versus alternatives, (2) lost local,
state, and federal income tax when a person is detained instead of
working, and (3) the supportive costs (i.e. safety net) that must be
made up for a family when the main income earner is detained.304
2. Convergence Theory in the Immigration Detention
Abolition Movement: A Solution that Follows the Money
If the abolition movement is to be successful, it will need support
from a broad coalition. An argument premised on the fiscal benefit of
immigration detention abolition is most likely to be appealing across
ideological lines and specifically to a conservative audience.305 In this
case, there is a clear and simple cost-benefit analysis to show that
providing legal counsel and incorporating community-based support
programs is less costly than immigration detention while still
promoting attendance at future hearings.306 Added benefits to a
universal representation program include the fact that it eliminates
the harm of detention and results in better long-term results for
immigrants and their families by increasing the likelihood an
individual will succeed in her case.
Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in
2003, the federal government has spent an estimated $333 billion on
the agencies that carry out immigration enforcement.307 Since its
creation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement spending has nearly
tripled, from $3.3 billion to $8.4 billion today.308 According to a recent
report, much of this spending “has gone to increasing the agency’s
ability to hold immigrants in detention in locations around the
country.”309 The number of ICE agents devoted to Enforcement and
Removal Operations (ERO) increased from 2,710 in 2003 to 8,201 in
2019.310 Despite Congress only appropriating funding for 40,250 beds,
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See Markowitz, supra note 9, at 145 (“[I]mplementing such a program on a
national scale would be costly, but the massive scale-down in punitive enforcement
contemplated . . . would more than offset any such costs.”).
306. Id. at 144–45 (“The data demonstrate that the most important thing we can
do to improve appearance rates in immigration court is to provide lawyers.”).
307. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE COST OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND
BORDER SECURITY
1
(2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
research/the-cost-of-immigration-enforcement-and-border-security.
308. Id. at 3.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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in 2019, ICE’s average daily population in custody was 50,165
persons, an increase of 19% from the prior year.311 Additionally, in
2019, the Trump administration constructed several “tent camps”
throughout the desert, near the border. The daily cost of detaining
each of the thousands of children who were held there totaled $775.312
Inhumanity aside, the average cost of detaining children with their
families was estimated at between $256–$298 per day.313 These costs
arose because of the administration’s knee-jerk effort to institute a
policy of “zero tolerance” and family separation. In comparison, other
countries, such as Canada, have a presumption of release (which the
U.S. also had previously), and provides community wrap-around
services.314 The result has been a compliance rate of 94 percent and a
cost of $10–12 per day as opposed to the $179 needed per day to detain
a single adult.315 The economic costs of immigration detention clearly
demonstrate that it is unwarranted, and point toward other more
cost-effective, humane, and sustainable solutions.316 Though not
examined here, additional costs of the current immigration detention
system include various externalities that occur during detention of a
massive number of persons—such as the splitting up of families or
distrust in the government.

311. See ICE Details How Border Crisis Impacted Immigration Enforcement in FY
2019, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/features/ERO-2019 (last
updated Oct. 29, 2021).
312. Luke Darby, Trump’s Child Detention Camps Cost $775 Per Person Every
Day, GQ (June 25, 2019) https://www.gq.com/story/trump-detention-camps-cost.
313. Id.
314. SECOR ET AL., supra note 266.
315. Id.; see INT’L DET. COAL., THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES: A HANDBOOK FOR
PREVENTING UNNECESSARY IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2013), https://idcoalition.org/
alternatives-to-detention-in-canada/; see also ALICE EDWARDS, UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH SERIES: BACK TO
BASICS: THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND SECURITY OF PERSON AND ‘ALTERNATIVES TO
DETENTION’ OF REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, STATELESS PERSONS AND OTHER
MIGRANTS (2011), https://www.unhcr.org/4dc949c49.pdf (discussing alternatives to
detention in other countries); OPHELIA FIELD, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR
REFUGEES, LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH SERIES: ALTERNATIVES TO
DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES (2006), https://www.refworld.org/
pdfid/4472e8b84.pdf (discussing international detention practices).
316. See, e.g., WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, THE FAMILY CASE MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM: WHY CASE MANAGEMENT CAN AND MUST BE PART OF THE US APPROACH TO
IMMIGRATION 8–10 (2019), https://s33660.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/TheFamily-Case-Management-Program.pdf (arguing that case management programs are
far cheaper than either detention in an adult facility or in ICE’s family detention
facilities).
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Immigration detention is inordinately expensive.317 This is
especially so when considered against other civil enforcement
agencies.318 Much of the reason for this rise in expense is likely due to
the conflation of criminal activity and migration,319 despite a
deafening roar of evidence to the contrary.320 Therefore, the key issue
is whether providing legal counsel is a more cost-efficient way of
ensuring compliance with immigration hearings. As outlined below,
the data demonstrate that it is.
3. Fiscal Analysis
On average, the daily cost of immigration detention is $129.64 for
one adult321 and $295.94 for a member of a family unit, with an
average predicted daily population of 54,000.322 In 2019, the average
stay in detention was approximately fifty-five days.323 However, this
317. See Markowitz, supra note 9, at 136, 144 (noting that ICE’s funding “has
risen from $3.3 billion in 2003, the year after its creation, to $7.5 billion in 2018—an
increase of approximately 130%[,]” while also noting that, “[i]n 2000, just before the
creation of ICE, the country’s undocumented population stood at 7 million[,]” while
“DHS’s most recent estimate of the undocumented population is 12 million.”).
318. See Marouf, supra note 4, at 2149 (“The United States spends more money
on immigration enforcement than on the FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency, Secret
Service, U.S. Marshalls Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms and Explosives
combined.”).
319. Flanagan, supra note 14, at 51–52 (“The integration of criminal and
immigration law enforcement agencies and the expansion of immigration detention
‘indicate that incapacitation to prevent future criminality has assumed unprecedented
prominence as a justification for immigration detention.’” (quoting Kreimer, supra
note 78, at 1514)).
320. See, e.g., Alex Nowrasteh, Immigration and Crime—What the Research Says,
CATO AT LIBERTY BLOG (July 14, 2015, 11:49AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/
immigration-crime-what-research-says (presenting a thorough, if informal, accounting
of the various most prominent studies and theories debunking the conflation of
criminality and migration); see also, e.g., Holly Yan & Dan Simon, Undocumented
Immigrant Acquitted in Kate Steinle Death, CNN (Dec. 1, 2017, 2:21AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/us/kate-steinle-murder-trial-verdict/index.html
(discussing the resolution of the killing of Kate Steinle).
321. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T BUDGET
OVERVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 2020, at 6, 16 (2019); see also DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FISCAL YEAR
2017, at 5–6 (2017) (funding 30,913 detention beds for fiscal year 2017); Marouf, supra
note 4, at 2149 (estimating a cost of $187 per person).
322. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION,
FISCAL YEAR 2020, at ICE-6, ICE–O&S-16 (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/19_0318_MGMT_CBJ-Immigration-Customs-Enforcement_0.pdf.
323. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES BY
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data may not account for a true representation of the duration of a
typical detention stay. For example, a 2013 lawsuit produced data
showing that “noncitizens who applied for relief from removal were
held in California ICE detention centers for an average of 421
days.”324 Even by the lower number, the average cost of a total stay in
detention for an adult would be over $7,000 for a single adult and over
$16,000 for a member of a family unit. By comparison, the
approximate cost for representation of an individual in removal
proceedings by an attorney working for a non-profit is $5,000.325 The
most successful pilot program for family case management, which has
a 99% compliance rate, would cost less than a mere additional $15 per
day.326 This would bring the total to $5,825 to provide an individual
with an attorney for the duration of their case, as well as wrap-around
services for those two months during which they would have been
detained. This demonstrates a per-case savings amount of over
$1,000. However, as mentioned above, immigration detention is not
just costly to taxpayers because it is expensive. Immigration detention
is costly because of the harm it does to families and the disruption it
causes in the daily life of those who are detained. A recent study found
that the universal representation program in New York would save

AGENCY 4 (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/
default/files/research/immigration_detention_in_the_united_states_by_agency.pdf.
324. Id.
325. CAL. COAL. FOR UNIVERSAL REPRESENTATION, CALIFORNIA’S DUE PROCESS
CRISIS: ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL FOR DETAINED IMMIGRANTS 16 (2016),
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/access-to-counsel-Calif-coalitionreport-2016-06.pdf; LOCAL PROGRESS: THE NAT’L MUN. POL’Y NETWORK, UNIVERSAL
REPRESENTATION: FILLING THE DUE PROCESS GAP FOR PEOPLE IN IMMIGRATION
COURT 57 (2019), https://localprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/UniversalRepresentation.pdf. It is worth noting that these estimates are based on
representation in high-cost areas such as New York City, and typically require travel
to remote detention facilities. It is possible that the cost could be reduced based on the
geographic area where representation is taking place.
326. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, supra note 316, at 1, 8, 10 (estimating a daily
cost of $38.47 per 2.5-member family unit or $14.05 per person).
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the state about $5.9 million annually.327 Similar cost savings have
been found in other states.328
This fiscal accounting demonstrates that universal representation
is a viable alternative to immigration detention, because of its focus
on justice, economic efficiency, and beneficial outcomes for society at
large. Most importantly, universal representation is a viable
alternative because it increases the likelihood that individuals will
attend their hearings, while significantly reducing the costs to
taxpayers. When families have an attorney, they will appear at their
hearings nearly 100% of the time.329 Because of the civil purpose
implicit in immigration detention—i.e., that its main purpose is to
ensure attendance at future hearings—providing universal
representation would eliminate the need to detain any individual
being held in immigration detention.330
There are several current projects that are now successful, and
there is a large advocacy effort underway to support the expansion of
these programs.331 One additional benefit is that these programs have
demonstrated a substantial increase in the likelihood of success. Here,
that success is meaningful as it affects an individual’s ability to gain
long-term employment, support their family, and contribute to society
generally. Immigration status, which typically is the result of a
successful case, results in stability, which itself has important positive
economic benefits.
327. CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, THE NEW YORK IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY
PROJECT: GOOD FOR FAMILIES, GOOD FOR EMPLOYERS, AND GOOD FOR ALL NEW
YORKERS
5
(2013),
https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/
immgrant_family_unity_project_print_layout.pdf (basing its cost-savings analysis on
estimates to the shift in costs that would occur in employer turnover costs, loss of
taxpayer income, education costs, foster care costs, and costs in child health insurance
programs following the deportation of a parent).
328. ERIKA NAVA, N. J. POL’Y PERSP., LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN IMMIGRATION
COURTS LEADS TO BETTER OUTCOMES, ECONOMIC STABILITY 4 (2018),
http://www.njpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/NJPP-Universal-LegalRepresentation-Report-June-2018.pdf (discussing New Jersey’s estimated cost
savings).
329. Markowitz, supra note 9, at 145 (2019) (“[D]ata show that virtually every
family who was released from immigration detention and had a lawyer showed up for
all their immigration court hearings (99%).”).
330. See Karen Berberich, Annie Chen, Corey Lazar, & Emily Tucker, VERA INST.
OF JUST., Module 1: The Case for Universal Representation, in ADVANCING UNIVERSAL
REPRESENTATION: A TOOLKIT 14 (2018) https://www.vera.org/advancing-universalrepresentation-toolkit/the-case-for-universal-representation-1
(“When
the
government detains people during their removal proceedings, one of the primary
reasons is to ensure that they make their upcoming court appearances.”).
331. See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUST. supra note 149 (discussing the Vera Institute’s
SAFE Network, which supports eighteen programs in eleven different states).
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4. Conclusion
Some may object to the inclusion of an economic argument because
it reduces the humanity of the individuals for whom it advocates to a
series of figures and numbers. Yet, as mentioned above, Bell’s
convergence theory supports the conclusion that ideologically, an
economic argument may be the only way to obtain support from
certain political actors. As García Hernández explains, “Bell’s theory
. . . remains persuasive: the possibility of forward-moving shifts in the
law exist in moments in which elite interests align with those of
subordinated groups.”332 In the current landscape, an example can be
made of the Washington Football Team, the owner of which resisted
for years the changing of its name, fighting tooth and nail, denying
claims of racism. The owner vowed that the name would never change,
until it became apparent that continuing to resist this change would
result in financial fallout.333 Many decried the fact that it took money
to make this decision - that the only reason the Washington Football
Team no longer uses a racist trope as its mascot is because it was no
longer profitable. But isn’t that the point? The reality is that money
is now frequently used in place of actual voice preferences as a form
of speech or expression.334 One way to look at this advocacy is as a
direct translation of the will of the people. The same lesson could
apply here.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a federally funded universal representation
program can serve as a practical first step toward the abolition of
immigration detention and the other harsh enforcement mechanisms
that are utilized today. While abolition is typically an ideology
espoused by a small subsection of the general population, its purpose
can be achieved through a less partisan and broader reaching ideal –
332. García Hernández, supra note 125, at 1399.
333. Ken Belson & Kevin Draper, Washington N.F.L. Team to Drop Name, Pro
Football, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/sports/
football/washington-redskins-new-name.html (last updated Aug. 19, 2021); see also
Dave Johnson, Column: It Took Financial Pressure for Snyder to Change Name,
WTOPNEWS (Jul. 13, 2020), https://wtop.com/washington-football/2020/07/column-ittook-financial-pressure-for-snyder-to-change-name/; Rick Maese, A Redskins name
change would be costly at first but it could end up as a lucrative move, WASH. POST
(July 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/07/08/redskins-namechange-would-be-costly-first-could-end-up-lucrative-move/.
334. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010).
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fiscal efficiency and responsibility. By demonstrating that the
provision of counsel and other wrap around services is significantly
less costly than immigration detention, while also showing that
providing counsel and wrap around services is an extremely effective
way to ensure compliance, this Article hopes to demonstrate appeal
for such a proposal to those who may not typically align with an
abolitionist ethic. It is clear that immigration detention is harmful
and inordinately expensive. It separates families, causes
psychological and physical harm to parents and their children, and all
too frequently results in death and other irreparable harm.
Immigration detention causes economic harm to local communities
and strains state and federal resources. Universal representation is
in itself a way to end the vast majority of immigration detention. It
will ensure immigrants attend their hearings, while also ensuring a
greater likelihood of success in their cases. Universal representation
can help keep families together, lower costs to US taxpayers, and
promote a more just and equitable society.

